

Bundled deck

1954—Year of the Great Thaw

Turkey (see page 22)

porter



The Zone of Silence



IN THE PACIFIC off Vancouver Island, there is a stretch of water known as "The Zone of Silence." Because this area is acoustically dead, no sound can penetrate it. And since no siren or bell warns ships of dangerous reefs, the ocean floor is studded with wrecks.

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
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THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Watch on the Right

Just a year ago the newspapers reported that the British had discovered a secret neo-Nazi ring in West Germany—a tentacular affair with connections in many countries including, of all places, East Germany. Chancellor Adenauer himself, a man not inclined to wild talk, was quoted in the *New York Times* as having said that the neo-Nazi group probably was "financed in some degree 'from the East.'" East of Bonn, the West German capital, and all the way around the earth to the Pacific there is Communism. The Communists must have had some good reasons for looking with sympathy at a rebirth of Nazi nationalism in Germany.

In Italy, particularly at the time of the last elections, the "activists" in Togliatti's party went out of their way to try to convince all those whom they could not induce to vote for the extreme Left that the next best thing was to vote for the extreme Right, which means neo-Fascism. The activists went so far as to promote new organizations of "left-wing Fascists," as the Communist press put it. Some "honest and progressive" neo-Fascist writers were encouraged to air their views in Communist newspapers or launch journalistic ventures of their own.

A few weeks ago a group of nine French parliamentarians went to Warsaw as honored guests of the Polish government. Among them were Mr. Daladier, a man whose name means appeasement and Munich, and two leaders of that party which still finds its unofficial inspiration in General deGaulle. Both Daladier and deGaulle are bitter opponents of a European army.

Obviously, there is something new

and queer going on in the world. It would be absurd to accuse the Gaullists of being pro-Communist, but it is not absurd to assume that the Communists are pleased with the anti-EDC agitation of the Gaullists. Actually, what characterizes the Communists in the countries they do not rule is their boundless broadmindedness. They are ready to give inspiration and assistance to any man or any movement that hampers the work of democracy—and the more to the Right they are, the better. Above all, the Communists follow the trends of politics: If these move toward conservatism or reaction, the Communists always manage to adjust

themselves. There are many indications that the trends in most European countries are toward conservatism just as those in Asian nations are toward extreme nationalism. The Communists go along. They are the parasites of success.

Until a few years ago, when to be leftist meant to be smart, there used to be a huge leftward marginal zone with scattered settlements of party members, fellow travelers, useful idiots, and the like. But now we had better look toward the Right if we want to defend ourselves from marginal movements. For Communism too followed election returns.

To put it in American terms, it is

IDENTIFICATION

"Truman and Democrat are synonymous with diplomatic failure, military failure, death and tragedy."

Who spoke these words? A ranting partisan,
Rash, goaded, uninformed, intemperate?
Ah no—a cultivated gentleman,
Closely acquainted with affairs of state.
In short, this unadulterated hooey
Reveals the hidden depths of Mr. Dewey.


PERFUMED NOTE

(From the Democratic National Committee to Talmadge, Shivers, et al.)

Come back, come back, dear Democrats,
We need you in the fold!
See how the bad Republicans
The Civil Rights uphold!
If you come back, dear Democrats,
And play with us again
We promise we'll be gentle with
The Southern citizen;
Agreed that in your Southern states
Two words must ne'er be spoken
If any trails to C____ R____
Are ever to be broken.

—SEC

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BEFORE BERIA—by Jonathan Swift

From "A Voyage to Laputa" in *Gulliver's Travels*

"... In the kingdom of Tribnia, by the natives called Langden, where I had sojourned some time in my travels, the bulk of the people consist in a manner wholly of discoverers, witnesses, informers, accusers, prosecutors, evidencers, swearers, together with their several subservient and subaltern instruments, all under the colours and conduct of ministers of state and their deputies. The plots in that kingdom are usually the workmanship of those persons who desire to raise their own characters of profound politicians, to restore new vigour to a crazy administration, to stifle or divert general discontents, to fill their pockets with forfeitures, and raise or sink the opinion of public credit, as either shall best answer their private advantage. It is first agreed and settled among them, what suspected persons shall be accused of a plot; then, effectual care is taken to secure all their letters and papers, and put the criminals in chains. These papers are delivered to a set of artists, very dexterous in finding out the mysterious meanings of words, syllables, and letters. For instance, they can discover a close-stool to signify a privy council; a flock of geese, a senate; a lame

dog, an invader; . . . the plague, a standing army; a buzzard, a prime minister; the gout, a high priest; a gibbet, a secretary of state; a chamberpot, a committee of grandees; a sieve, a court lady; a broom, a revolution; a mouse-trap, an employment; a bottomless pit, the treasury; a sink, the court; a cap and bells, a favourite; a broken reed, a court of justice; an empty tun, a general; a running sore, the administration.

"When this method fails, they have two others more effectual, which the learned among them call acrostics and anagrams. First they can decipher all initial letters into political meanings. Thus, N. shall signify a plot; B. a regiment of horse; L. a fleet at sea; or secondly by transposing the letters of the alphabet in any suspected paper, they can discover the deepest designs of a discontented party. So for example if I should say in a letter to a friend, Our brother Tom has just got the piles, a skilful decipherer would discover that the same letters which compose that sentence may be analysed into the following words: Resist, a plot is brought home; The tour. And this is the anagrammatic method."

as if the comrades' center of action had to a large extent moved from Union Square to Park Avenue. It is a very strange thing, and evidences of it can be seen all over Europe and Asia—but not exclusively in Europe and Asia.

Ike the Target

We wonder whether the American people, Republicans and Democrats alike, realize to what an extent our President has recently become the object of vicious attacks. The odd thing is that the attacks come from people who certainly voted for him.

Some of them may have been followers of the late Senator Taft, but to call this group "Taftists" would be an insult to Taft's memory. Masters of hatred, they have found a new technique of destruction—the attack

by indirection, the round-the-table billiard shot. Their immediate targets, the men they shoot at, are pillars of society like Secretary John Foster Dulles and Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith. They are conservatives like lawyer Arthur H. Dean, who has been negotiating for us in Korea, and *Fortune* executive C. D. Jackson.

Why are these men targets? What have they in common? They are close to the President. The latest addition to the list is the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower.

If the "get Ike by carom" attack came only from the lunatic fringe, it might be dismissed as negligible. But it doesn't. The Washington newsletter "Human Events," which often spearheads the attacks, is virtually the house organ of the so-

called Loyal American Underground which works from its well-fortified bunkers in the Pentagon, the State Department, and Congress. However, this underground has found a pipeline to such publications of mass circulation as *U.S. News & World Report*, which used to be a very factual news magazine. The underground operators—quoted under code numbers from 1 to 12—filled many pages of *U.S. News* for December 18, 1953, with their "revelations." The State Department, according to them, is still dominated by the old "Acheson crowd." That is why the Underground is still underground and persecuted. The Underground has to defend itself, as one may see by this quotation from *Newsweek*: "When a member of the network was caught passing on classified information the other day, he threatened to denounce his superior as a 'Communist' unless the charge against him was dropped."

The power of the "Roosevelt-Truman-Acheson-Marshall crowd" is, indeed, according to the Loyal Underground, so undiminished that it can do terrible things even to such a seemingly sensible man as Samuel C. Waugh, conservative Republican banker from Nebraska, who is serving in the State Department as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. "He's apparently mesmerized by the bright boys around him, the Acheson boys," said "official No. 6" in the *U.S. News* article. "He seems fascinated by the gobbledegook words these fellows use."

It seems incredible that only a little over a year ago a large majority of Americans used to chant "I Like Ike." Many who voted against him liked Ike all the same. In fact there were few who at one time or another had not wanted Ike for President. But now it looks as if to like Ike or, even worse, to be liked by Ike, is almost seditious.

When is the frontal attack on the President going to be launched? When is the Loyal American Underground going to question the President's loyalty? It will be a sickening day, but we had better prepare ourselves to meet it—all of us, including Ike. Judging by the way things have been going on aboveground and underground over the last few months, that day is coming.

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CORRESPONDENCE

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To the Editor: The articles you have been running recently on the future of the Democratic Party are constructive and stimulating.

I believe that the Democratic Party has got to stake out a somewhat new position, and I hope that we will use this period to do some ardent soul searching. One of the first things we must realize is that in the 1930's we never really did find the answer to full employment. Only the defense program in 1940 put our people to work and only the war and the cold war that followed have kept them at work.

The subject of full employment in a "normal economy" (if we can imagine any such thing under the present conditions) deserves to be examined in a fresh and constructive manner if we are to avoid the clichés of the past, which in my opinion simply did not provide effective answers.

On the subject of civil rights it seems to me that there should be less squabbling between North and South and a greater realization on the part of the North that discrimination is rampant in almost every Northern city. The South has been slow and often wrong, but it has a right to be annoyed at the sanctimonious attitude of many Northern Democrats who take for granted the Negro slums in their own back yards.

The Emancipation Proclamation was proclaimed just ninety-one years ago this January and it is still a long way from becoming a fact, not only in Alabama but in Chicago, Illinois.

The most important things the Democratic Party has to do is to find some means of developing a broad mass following in America for a liberal program abroad. Even those Republicans who denounce liberalism here at home as "creeping socialism" must recognize the fact that in Asia and Europe our greatest failure so far has been our unwillingness to stand up for the rights of the little people.

The Marshall Plan, which in my opinion was a magnificent effort, relied too much on putting money in at the top in the hope that it would filter down to the people at the bottom. Somehow we must develop an identification with the men in the factories of Italy, France, Japan, and India and with the people who work in the fields. Unless these people can be rallied, not only in America but throughout the world, we are sooner or later going to find the world divided between the reactionary Right, which offers nothing, and the reactionary Left, which offers still less.

The Democratic Party has a very great role to play in the United States. Whether it can play it or not is an open question. In my opinion a great deal will depend on how many are really willing to follow the leadership of such people as Adlai Stevenson, and how competent this leadership is

in developing a program which is understandable to a broad mass of people. What I am urging in effect is that we get away from the old clichés of liberalism and find our way to some new solid ground on which we can stand with confidence, not only in this country but in our dealings with the rest of the world.

CHESTER BOWLES
Essex, Connecticut

THE CINCINNATI STORY

To the Editor: William Hessler's article "It Didn't Work in Cincinnati" (*The Reporter*, December 22) contains an error, and I would like to set the record straight. The *Cincinnati Post* did not endorse ten candidates for the nine seats in city council. It endorsed nine.

DICK THORNBURG
Editor
The Cincinnati Post
Cincinnati

To the Editor: W. H. Hessler's article "It Didn't Work in Cincinnati" was a reassuring account of the power of an aroused, adequately informed public opinion in combating individual and party demagogery. However, since individual martyrdom is often the touchstone of public reaction, I ask what became of Cincinnati's Hester Prynne—Sydney Williams?

If this individual of proven merit remains discredited by the action of irresponsible politics and journalism, perhaps "it" did work in Cincinnati, and individual liberties have once again been assigned secondary importance to party survival.

Has the Charter group gone so far in reform as to reinstate Williams, or is he now merely a figure doomed to wear the scarlet letter, valued only for the lesson in political morality his ruined presence teaches?

THOMAS W. CASHEL
Cold Spring Harbor, New York

(*Our apologies to the Post and also to the Enquirer. Both of them endorsed nine candidates for nine seats. It was only the Times-Star that endorsed ten.*)

As for Mr. Williams, he is no longer working for the city of Cincinnati. He is currently employed by a private firm of planning consultants and hopes to find a position in city planning that will make fuller use of his training and experience.)

'DARKLY INTO HIS BODY'

To the Editor: I admired James Hinton, Jr.'s, article on Hi-Fi in *The Reporter* of November 10 for the clarity and for the timeliness with which it helps to set straight some important aspects of our musical life. I always felt very strongly the diminishing tension from my part as a listener, once I knew exactly what was going to happen in a specific recording. This tension could only be partly revived if I played that record for a group of friends for the first time.

Two more essential ingredients of the live concert, I think, are missing in listening to recordings. First, the actual contact between a real performer and a real audience at a given time and place, with its currents and countercurrents; second, the enjoyment of music as being part of a listening community—emotional introversion, as Christopher Caudwell calls it. ("Rhythm puts people . . . in touch with each other in a particular way—physiologically and emotionally. They already see each other, but this is not the kind of communion that is desired. On the contrary, when they cease to see each other so clearly, when each retires darkly into his body and shares the same physiological and elemental beat, then they have a special . . . commonness that is distinct from the commonness of seeing each other in the same real world of perceptual experience. It is instinctive commonness as opposed to conscious commonness . . .") This, I believe, has validity for a tribal festival as well as for a concert in Carnegie Hall. And it is this property of uniting an audience that is sunk by a great composer into the texture of his work.

For all these reasons I strongly believe that the first impression a human being receives of music should be not record or radio, but rather one where a work of music performs its intended function.

ERIC SIMON
Sherman, Connecticut

WHOSE AID? WHOSE COMFORT?

To the Editor: With enthusiasm—but also a great deal of sadness—I read "The Reporter's Notes" of December 22, which at last put the finger where I had put mine since that loudmouth from Wisconsin opened his trap for the first time in 1949. As an old hand at propaganda analysis, I have been saying to anyone who would listen that all the gold and platinum of Russia could not pay this guy for his aid and comfort rendered to the Soviet Union.

After a career of seven years in psychological warfare in and out of government service, it was to me as plain as the Hammer and Sickle on a Red sheet that here was an operation of supreme magnitude against the unity of our nation: one such as history has never known before. This was so crassly obvious that not only the experienced eye, ear, and nose could detect the signs but also any headline-chasing editor or simple-minded addict to spy and allied mystery thrillers. So from the start I was hopeful the so-called "demagogue" would be slapped down on short order. Due to "Senatorial courtesy," however, nothing happened. Congress's abysmal ignorance and paranoiac isolationism have let the operation continue, to the huge enjoyment and benefit of the Kremlin.

SIEGFRIED WAGENER
Allenspark, Colorado

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from an article in the bi-weekly news magazine, THE PATHFINDER:

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CARIBBEAN. There are still undiscovered Edens at America's back door. Tobago, the Robinson Crusoe island that rivals Tahiti, where living is so cheap the island's chief official gets only \$240 a month. Or Grenada, which, as a native described it: "Dis islan', suh, is 'ring Gahd mek from rainbo'." There, for \$12 a week, you can rent a three-bedroom house with its own private beach. Many of the best spots can be reached only by trading schooner: Go down to the waterfront at Grenada or elsewhere and bargain with dusky skippers to make your own price—keep this up and cruise all the lesser islands of this jeweled chain.

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Atlantic Islands. Green cones standing out of the sparkling waters of the South Atlantic—these are the Azores and the Canaries. Tropical flowers, sandy beaches, and the charm of old Spain are combined here—with rents of about \$20 a month, groceries for a couple at \$10 a week and servants \$5 a month each.

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WHO—WHAT—WHY—

THERE ARE a thousand and one causes that make the year 1954 a turning point in the affairs of the world. In the words of Max Ascoli's editorial, 1954 will be the "year of the great thaw," in which frozen international political positions will give way to new initiatives and become subjects of fresh debate. The era of negotiation is here—on Korea, on Germany, on the atom, and probably on other subjects of major importance. As we said in our last issue, the President's proposal for an international atomic-energy agency made at the United Nations marked this turning point. From now on we shall be attacking the causes of war itself and risking war through the very sincerity with which we seek to avoid it. But we have to go forward. That is why it becomes imperative for us to look clearly at the difficulties of all sorts that confront us.

A main and predictable point in the Russian reaction to President Eisenhower's proposal is a renewed insistence on some sort of global disarmament, with particular emphasis on the abolition of those weapons which give the West its greatest strength. This reaction is utterly unrealistic and the Russians certainly know it. But this attitude of theirs must not be allowed to force us into any seeming opposition to disarmament and peace. David F. Cavers, Fessenden Professor of Law and Associate Dean of the Harvard Law School, analyzes steps our policy-makers might take to further an international pool of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and also to diminish international tensions and come within sight of realistic and honest moves toward disarmament. In the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* of September, 1953, Mr. Cavers examined the legal safeguards necessary to keep the nation's business running in the aftermath of an atomic attack. Another widely discussed article by Mr. Cavers, "A Fresh Outlook on Disarmament," appeared in our issue of July 8, 1952.

The focal point of the "no war, no peace" era was Korea. Now that we are in the era of negotiations, it is useful to review the success and failure of our previous experiments in wrestling with international Communism. In Korea we had a long and nerve-racking experience in peacemaking. What did we learn? Among other things, that we have been the victims of our devotion to the classic rules of international law while all the time we were dealing with an utterly unprincipled enemy who thinks of these rules only when they can be made to serve his ends.

Vernon Aspaturian's article should give food for thought. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University and former lecturer at the University of California in Los Angeles, Mr. Aspaturian has had direct experience on his subject while serving in Tokyo with the U.S. and U.N. Command, where he analyzed Soviet propaganda trends in the Far East. He also participated in the formulation of psychological-warfare plans and policies in the Korean conflict.

M. J. Rossant, editor of a department called "The Trend" in *Business Week*, follows closely the economic policies of the government, and writes here about a man who is likely to play a major role in the effort to keep our economy steady against the dangers that threaten it. He is Arthur F. Burns, head of the three-man Council of Economic Advisers.

THE STORY of contemporary Turkey is a success story not only for the Turkish people but for ourselves. On this magazine we are always happy when we can report instances where our diplomacy and material aid have succeeded beyond question. Following his article on Greece (December 8, 1953), Bogdan Raditsa now continues his investigation of the concrete results of our diplomacy in his present eyewitness story about Turkey. Mr. Raditsa, a native Yugoslav, was an official in Tito's Gov-

ernment until he broke away from it in 1946. He now teaches at Fairleigh Dickinson College in Rutherford, New Jersey.

Anzia Yezierska's simple, quiet, and extremely distressing account of life in a run-down New York "residential hotel" is unfortunately no isolated experience. Born in Poland, reared in poverty in New York's East Side, Miss Yezierska used this background in a novel, *Hungry Hearts*. The movies bought it and the book was a best seller. In her autobiography, *Red Ribbon on a White Horse*, she told why she left Hollywood and returned to a life among the poor she knew and loved in New York. The poet W. H. Auden wrote the preface to *Red Ribbon*; Reinhold Niebuhr praised the author's honesty and self-revelation. Miss Yezierska's short stories are in several anthologies.

IN THE House of Commons Sir Winston Churchill recently began a speech with the following sentence: "The curious fact that the House preferred to give two days to television policy and only one day to foreign affairs may be noted by future historians as an example of a changing sense of proportion in modern form." Blake Ehrlich, a free-lance writer, gives the entertaining background for Sir Winston's remarks. Television aroused Parliament; commercials—pleasantly illustrated in our pages by John Ployardt—are to appear on British screens; we await with interest the reactions of a critical British public.

Churchill, maker of history and magnificent recorder of the history he makes, is the subject of Henry Steele Commager's review of *Triumph and Tragedy*. Professor Commager is a regular contributor.

William Knapp, who reviews the work of Frank Lloyd Wright, is Assistant Managing Editor of *The Reporter*.

THE VIEW of Constantinople on our cover and the drawings illustrating Bogdan Raditsa's article on Turkey are the work of Fred Zimmer, a young American artist who has just returned from Europe and the Middle East. They are based on sketches and water colors he made on the spot.

The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

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Will You "ADOPT"

A SPANISH CIVIL WAR REFUGEE?

Here are two notes from our field secretary in France:

5/17/53: I went to see Luis G. What misery! He is a sick old man who lives in a cabin with a beaten earth floor. For four years he has had no sheets for his bed. He gets 2500 francs (\$7) relief a month.

9/12/53: We had a visit from Luis G. He has received the two CARE blanket and sheet packages and is overwhelmed with happiness. The American who "adopted" him also sent some clothes and he came to see us all dressed up. He showed us everything, even the color of his socks. It was touching to see him turning around in our dining room like a movie actor, so that we could admire him.

Luis G. is one of the Spanish Civil War refugees "adopted" by an American family through Spanish Refugee Aid. Thousands of these veterans of the first war against fascism, and their families, are living in France today, some sick, some old, all poor and forgotten. After fifteen years of exile, war, Nazi prison camps, and low-paid jobs, these people cannot survive without help.

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1954—Year of the Great Thaw

IT IS ONLY a few weeks since the President's United Nations speech, and already we have risen above the lowland of festering clichés. When the proposal to negotiate on atomic power was first made, batteries of phonographs started to grind out the old tunes: "Propaganda!" and "Appeasement!" From other loudspeakers the crackling of somewhat different records was heard: "We have gained the psychological offensive" or "Let's give them a chance to put themselves in the wrong." But not all these noises—indeed, no power on earth—can halt the turn of events: Negotiations between the democracies and the Communists will take place. After the long, long freeze, 1954 will be the year of the great thaw.

This turn, which the President has solidly registered with the unmatched authority of our nation and his name, certainly was determined by a conjunction of causes and occasions that weighed heavily on our ranks as well as those of our adversaries. In our country, the "new look" of our strategy features exactly those weapons of total destruction which we must produce and which we pray we shall never have to use. But as we cannot just rely on prayer, the new look of our strategy makes imperative a new look in our diplomacy.

Even the need for a new diplomacy is but one among the causes which have prompted the President to sound the call for a new try at the prevention of war. The many private reasons that the men in the Kremlin have for sitting at the negotiating table can only be guessed at now. But certainly there is a cause, transcending all others, that drives both us and the Russians along in this hazardous search for

peace: The nerves of men cannot remain stretched for too long. Since it is the Russians who have imposed this trial on the nerves of mankind, the very fact that negotiations are starting is a point that our side has scored.

ONE THING is sure: The coming negotiations, irrespective of subject—Germany or the atom—and irrespective of method—secret or open diplomacy—will be extraordinarily hard tests of Allied and of national unity.

We had better brace ourselves; it is going to be a hard pull. Ours is an overwhelmingly anti-Communist nation, and lately all groups and parties have been vying with each other in an attempt to prove the superior virtue of their own brand of anti-Communism. Yet by and large, for all our vociferous and sometimes hysterical anti-Communism, we are still underestimating Communism. We are inclined to look for short cuts and to rely on cures-all to eliminate this blight. Some find the cure-all in the fight against Communism at home. Others think that the way to uproot Communism is to fight misery abroad. Others rely primarily on keeping our national economy sound, while still others count on the ever-increasing retaliatory power of our Strategic Air Command. And so on. The advocate of each cure-all is inclined to belittle the others.

This is the way a democracy operates: Politically active citizens have a partial and partisan view of things, and the competition of partisanship promotes the welfare of the commonwealth. But Communism has an extraordinarily evil way of embittering partisanship in the nations it opposes. To ward off the Communist

danger a high degree of national unity is required of the citizens and parties in a democracy. This can never be the robotlike unity of the totalitarian countries; rather it must be based on the sense of emergency, on a need to see the danger whole and act accordingly.

As always happens whenever we and the unfortunate peoples on the other side come closer together—be it for purposes of killing each other or to reach a truce—we become more exposed to Communist guile. This was the case during the Korean War, when national unity was so shamefully lacking that both the conduct of the war and the outcome of the Panmunjom negotiations became partisan issues, exploited to inflame opinion and catch votes. To this day the debate still rages over why the morale of our armed forces has sunk so low. Many Americans still do not realize that the main reason is to be found in the fact that reckless partisanship prevented the Korean War from being considered a truly national war.

There is a great deal we should learn from our Korean experience. We must send men to negotiate who have minds at once subtle and forceful and candid—"wise as serpents and simple as doves." They must be men who can see through the systematic Communist obfuscations. In the coming negotiations our delegates must challenge Soviet Russia's pretense of defending the sovereignty of the nations on our side while it shackles the countries it dominates and conducts a world-wide conspiracy.

But even more important than the personal virtue or skill of our delegates is the moratorium on political and factional partisanship that we, the American people, must impose on ourselves.

The Armaments Race Can Be Stopped

DAVID F. CAVERS

BY COUPLING disclosure of the grim dimensions of our atomic arsenal with the vision of a world atomic pool, President Eisenhower did two things at once in his December 8 speech before the United Nations General Assembly. He converted Operation CANDOR into Operation HOPE. And, although his atomic plan had nothing to do with weapons, he suddenly brought back to life the moribund subject of disarmament.

The President's plan for a peacetime atomic-energy pool was actually only part of a proposal. The atom can mean more abundant and cheaper power—after a while. But right now it still means a perilous armaments race. A new U.S. proposal on disarmament is the indispensable next step.

TO BEGIN WITH, we must be realistic about the President's plan. If we look only at the facts, three constructive steps appear to have been taken:

¶The Soviets have been given notice, by President Eisenhower's studied failure to mention the Baruch proposal of 1946, that we shall no longer insist on that obsolete plan when we meet with the Russians in the private atomic talks. So we have succeeded in breaking a seven-year deadlock.

¶We have given the Commission an assignment that it can actually accomplish—the development of the atomic pool—at a time when the Commission seemed about to collapse.

¶The pool would help to solve one of the toughest questions a workable atomic-control plan must ultimately answer: what to do with the vast surplus of fissionable materials that the banning of atomic weapons

would probably create. If a control plan could be put into operation within, say, the next five years, the United States and the Soviet Union would for some time be embarrassed by atomic riches—fissionables in quantities too great for infant atomic-power industries to consume and too menacing to be left in national stockpiles in a world that had not wholly disarmed. An international bank, guaranteed against surprise seizure by either side, could provide an answer to that problem.

All this is surely progress. But if we are to be candid as well as hopeful, there is more that must be taken into account.

The Belligerent Atom

The Russians, who were wrong to be unimpressed with the possibilities of an atomic pool, were correct in assuming that it would not necessarily reduce atomic armaments. The President himself said that "initial and early contributions to this plan would be small." Yet the current output of both nations is large.

Published studies of the practicability of using atomic energy for industrial power show that atomic-power reactors will not absorb a really substantial volume of fissionables for at least five years. Over the same span, all the world's scientific and development needs will require a mere trickle. If, therefore, civilian needs are to govern the deposit of fissionables in an atomic bank, it will be a long, long time before these deposits cut back the size of military stockpiles.

Since our own stockpile is already enormous and the Russians' is presumably growing fast, emphasis in the arms race must soon shift from the actual production of A-bombs



and H-bombs to competition in methods of delivery and defense: supersonic bombers, guided missiles, radar screens, and dispersal. For such an armaments race, the only finish line is war. It will not slow down; it can only be stopped.

What then are the prospects for stopping it? The Kremlin and the U.S. State Department have both said they want to discuss the arms race in later private talks about the President's pool plan. But the Soviets coupled their acceptance of the President's bid with a reiterated insistence on "solemn and unconditional pledges not to use atomic, hydrogen or other weapons of mass extermination."

This has a depressingly familiar ring. It is a formula that enables the Russians to say "Nyet!" with a moral flourish. Nor is the demand easy for us to ignore, especially when they allege willingness to accompany the pledges with the simultaneous establishment of "strict international control."

Suppose the Soviets really do want to open negotiations looking to arms control. They still would have every reason to start by demanding a ban on atomic weapons. Their bargaining objective would be a reduction in nuclear weapons, our strongest arm. Marshaling world sentiment against these weapons is a costless opening move. But if they are ready to use the new occasion to join in a genuine exploration of arms-control possibilities, the President's speech will have accomplished much.

At the outset we must face the challenging proposal for an outright ban on A- and H-bombs. For the fact is that we would not be very happy to ban *only* nuclear weapons, however strict the controls. Is this

position defensible? Can our President portray the horror of atomic warfare and then decline to accept a plan for its prohibition?

Our answer can only be that our goal is to prevent warfare, not simply to avoid atomic warfare. The Soviet insistence on outlawing atomic weapons seeks simply a revision of the Marquess of Queensberry rules for war—an approach as outdated as poison gas. We have already joined Russia and nearly threescore other states in signing a United Nations Charter that outlaws "the threat or use of force." To outlaw one particular kind of force again adds no new safeguard.

Nor would the actual abolition of atomic weapons aid the cause of peace. We ourselves first proposed this measure. We did it, however, when our atomic arsenal was tiny and Russia's nonexistent, and when we were advocating timely action to curb a dangerous growth. Today we have vast atomic stockpiles, almost certainly bigger by far than Russia's. Abolition of atomic arms alone would require trusting the Russians not to use their massed non-atomic power against us—in effect a unilateral disarmament. Far from assuring security and peace, it would compel a frantic expansion in our non-atomic armament until we could protect ourselves.

Since 1951 our policy has been to seek U.N. control over all weapons. In that year we sponsored the merger of the two U.N. bodies concerned with planning atomic and conventional arms controls into a single U.N. Disarmament Commission.

The Soviet Answer

The Soviet reply to the President's U.N. speech seemed to say that the Russians wanted to discuss three related subjects: the "ban of the atomic weapon," a "strict international control over this banning," and a "considerable reduction in all other types of armaments."

If the Soviets are ready to discuss problems of arms control without insisting on the outlawing of atom weapons as a prior condition, what will our position be?

Nothing is so clear in this muddy business as the fact that the existing U.N. majority plan (the last incarnation of the Acheson-Lilienthal pro-

posals that resulted in the Baruch Plan) is obsolete.

Two developments have made this plan clearly inadequate: the great expansion in the world's atomic establishment and the recognition that controls must be expanded to include all armaments.

When the original plans were designed, atomic stockpiles were of negligible size. Every effort was therefore directed to assuring a tight control of atomic developments from the outset—by an international authority with very wide powers to dominate the production and use of atomic energy everywhere. Today, emphasis on elaborate control machinery seems futile. After seven years of mounting, uncontrolled production, a control agency could tell only approximately how many kilograms of U-235 and of plutonium each side had already produced. Atomic-energy projects are now so far advanced in several countries that turning them over to supranational management would be a far more drastic measure than in 1946.

Strategic Balance'

The U.N. majority plan was supposed to have been proof against even a little leak. However, there remained a potential danger that now begins to be a reality. It was realized at the start that atomic power would require the building up of stockpiles of nuclear fuel that could be seized and converted into atomic explosives. To discourage this, the principle of "strategic balance" was invented. There was to be a more or less even distribution of fissionable materials among the countries comprising the rival camps—an idea



which, understandably enough, was never worked out in concrete terms. Today, with our own stockpile by far the world's largest, we would cer-

tainly reject "strategic balance"; the President's "bank," engineered against surprise attack, would seem a better solution of the stockpile problem.

Again, Disarmament

When the idea of extending arms control to all weapons was accepted by the United Nations, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seemed to realize the steps that would have to be taken to bring the disarmament plans of both sides up to date. Both stuck by their earlier positions on atomic control, while reduction in conventional arms was added as a new but still separate goal. We then proposed an arms census to be made in stages, leaving atomic weapons to the last, and a substantial cut in men under arms. Russia proposed an arms census without stages and a one-third cut in all armaments.

Naturally, in a time of tension each side will seek a basis of arms reduction that leaves it relatively better off than its rival. But we are dealing here with powers that rely on different weapons, or on the same weapons in very different degrees. The prime difficulty is therefore to work out *equivalents* that will make it possible for the arms reduction in each country to represent a truly equal reduction in each nation's potential for fighting a modern war. With the utmost good will and eagerness, this is bound to be a long, exacting process.

Is there an easier, intermediate proposal that could get us started, and at the same time lay the basis for future reduction of arms? There is this: to stop worrying about cutting armaments and concentrate simply on halting the race where it is right now. This could be accomplished by a *standstill agreement*, freezing armaments—atomic and conventional—at their present levels.

Why Stop Now?

One predictable first reaction to a standstill proposal—both here and in the Soviet Union—is that it would be too risky: What if the other side is better equipped for war? But in the light of the President's speech, this does not seem to be the most serious obstacle.

The speech made it perfectly plain

that the competing powers have now reached a state of effective equality in armament. This does not mean that if some scale could be conceived to reduce H-bombs, A-bombs, radar screens, jet fighters, tanks, and infantrymen to a weighted index, the two nations' armaments would be in balance. It means something more important: that neither nation has any present hope of being able to wage successful war against the other without sustaining horrendous losses.

Atomic weapons have created this practical working balance in armaments. It is an unstable balance. For example, our new ground-to-air guided missile, the Nike (or its Russian counterpart), may provide considerable protection against delivery of A-bombs and H-bombs by plane. If so, the balance will be upset until the other side finds a way to deliver bombs without planes. Either side might produce a long-range guided missile with an atomic warhead that is both dependable and unstoppable. That too would destroy the equilibrium for a while. But it is not enough for such weapons to be invented; the physical means of employing them must be produced in volume. The Nike and its launching and guiding equipment are reported to comprise more than a million parts. Under a standstill agreement backed up by inspection, volume production of such new weapons could be prevented.

HERE WE encounter a familiar bogey: *inspection*. Arms control is meaningless without it. For a nation to say that it does not want inspection is simply a roundabout way of saying it does not want control. However, if the objection is not to the principle of inspection but rather to a particular kind of inspection, then there will be a problem for study and negotiation.

The recognition that controls must include all armaments drastically changes the character of the long-debated inspection problem. Inspection became an acute issue when controls were to be imposed for atomic armaments alone. Inspectors could certainly not police atomic arms and plants without discovering other military installations.

But now the Russians apparently concede that the problem of arms

control has to be faced as a whole. They may still claim that any inspection is dangerous because the inspectors might violate national sovereignty by looking at the wrong



things. But in general, objections to inspection can now be taken to mean objection to international arms control itself. When the Kremlin's negotiators start discussing inspection, we will know what they meant by phrases like "strict international control," which was used five times in their December 21 reply to the President's speech.

Where to Inspect

Under a standstill agreement, the tasks of a United Nations inspectorate would be first to take inventory of the state of armament and then to make sure that the working balance now existing is not upset. The technical problems involved would be great but not overwhelming. A standstill would be a great deal easier to enforce than an arms reduction, which would require cutting back important armaments while maintaining the status quo in all others. Under such an agreement, controls could be applied largely at the level of big-scale production; a detailed knowledge of secret devices and processes would not be absolutely essential.

HAVE WE ANY reason to believe that the Soviet Union is ready to begin serious negotiations about such a proposal? The change in top leadership may represent improvement, but as to this we can only guess. We do have mounting evidence, however, that the Communist economy is failing to provide enough consumer goods to maintain public morale. A standstill plan would not require the dismantling of the Red Army, but it would allow sharp reductions in the military budget, per-

mitting a reassuring rise in the Russian standard of living.

Of course a standstill is not an end in itself. It provides a period of preparation for further steps toward peace. As the inspection machinery was tested and improved, confidence would grow in the workability of more drastic controls. Arms-reduction talks could take place under favorable conditions. With economic well-being bettered and prospects for political settlement brighter, even a dictatorship would find it hard to reverse this trend.

The Political Knot

The subject of arms control may seem forbidding after the glimpse of a peaceful, co-operating atom-powered world that President Eisenhower has given us, but agreement on an effective control plan may in fact be easier to reach at this point than a political settlement. Arms control requires both sides to give up heavy burdens that neither likes to carry. A political compromise means that each side must give up cherished hopes and claims.

The psychological lift that must have been experienced by all the peoples the President's message reached could be followed by a reaction which would undo the good that the speech has done. The limitations of the atomic power pool will soon be widely understood: The Soviets will certainly be at pains to advertise them. To satisfy a world that wants peace even more than it wants atomic power, the United States will have to enter the private sessions of the U.N. Disarmament Commission with new proposals about arms as well as its new plan for a pool of atomic materials for peaceful uses.

Faced with the Soviet note, which proposed to abolish atomic war without saying just how, we ought to come up with plans that are gradualistic and non-Utopian—some feasible first step.

The President did this with the idea of a world atomic bank. The same kind of thinking applied to the problem of arms control would produce a plan for putting a brake on the armaments race. When the world's military powers have proved they have brakes, they can then try throwing the gears into reverse.

What We Should Learn From Panmunjom

VERNON ASPATURIAN

IN FIGHTING the enemy in Korea and in our negotiations with him there, our knowledge of how the Communist mind works has been enormously increased. We have learned what makes for his strength and what makes for his weakness. What we have learned in no way indicates that the Communist enemy is invincible either on the field of battle or at the conference table.

I. War by Treason

"THE PRINCIPAL condition for victory," read the 1937 *Field Regulations of the Red Army*, is "the winning over to the side of the proletarian revolution the working and peasant masses of the enemy army." Lenin's doctrine that a great potential reserve of military manpower lies within the ranks of the enemy proved the most significant innovation in modern military doctrine since the French Revolution.

This principle was responsible in large measure for the survival of the struggling Bolshevik Republic immediately after the Revolution in the face of overwhelming internal and external force. It made possible Marshal Tito's successful partisan struggle against Pavelic's Ustashi and Mihailovic's Chetniks in Yugoslavia. It was the dominant factor in the spectacular triumph of the Chinese Communist armies over those of Chiang Kai-shek, and was also partly responsible for the important initial successes of the North Korean People's Army, which freely replenished its own ranks by enrolling ROK prisoners.

The most illuminating single event of the Korean War, however, was not the successful enlistment of enemy soldiers by the Communist armies,

but the refusal of over fifty thousand Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war to be repatriated after the cessation of hostilities. It was this that prompted the Soviet U.N. delegate, Mr. Baranovsky, to forget himself—and Lenin's doctrine—to the extent of calling the right of prisoners of war not to go home "the

permit such acts of warfare as make mutual confidence impossible in time of future peace, such as . . . the instigation of treason in the state against which it is making war.

"Some sort of confidence in the enemy's frame of mind," he wrote, "must remain even in time of war, for otherwise no peace could be concluded, and the conflict would become a war of extermination." Kant was writing on the eve of the French Revolution. His words have become even truer since the Communist Revolution.



right to commit treason against the fatherland."

Obviously the military strategy of winning over the opposing army has its greatest application within the context of a national civil war. The Communist concept transcends the national civil war and makes all war part of a world civil war between proletariat and bourgeoisie. Amplifying von Clausewitz's dictum that war is the extension of politics to the battlefield, Lenin held that it is an extension of the class struggle.

Immanuel Kant must have foreseen something of this when he stated in his essay "Eternal Peace" that lasting peace is impossible as long as a "state at war with another shall

THE SUCCESS or failure of any army depends, in the final analysis, upon the loyalty of its members to the way of life they are dedicated to defend and preserve. The Communist employment of enemy manpower to bolster its own is based on a new conception of loyalty and assumes that the rank and file of the enemy army can be induced to transfer their allegiance from nation to class. "For the U.S.S.R.," writes a Soviet specialist on international law, Eugene Korovin, "the most valuable human material is found not only among its own soldiers . . . but also among the soldiers of the enemy, in great majority representing peasant, proletarian, and semi-proletarian masses of the population, who are eventual allies of the Workers' and Peasants' Republic."

'Fraternize'

The modern Communist technique of seducing enemy armies has been developed over thirty-five years of intensive practical experience. Almost from the very beginning of the Bolshevik state, the three devices of fraternization, indoctrination, and propaganda were adopted as active

allies of Communism. The initial emphasis was on fraternization. According to the theses of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern (1928): "The most important slogan for action at the front is that of fraternization. Its purpose is to unite soldiers, workers, and peasants from both sides of the trenches against bourgeois generals. The experience of the last war proved that mass fraternization inevitably leads to the class disintegration of the armies."

The first army to feel the full impact of this new dimension in warfare was the Kaiser's during the First World War. German troops were so seriously infected with Bolshevik propaganda that the German negotiators took prophylactic measures by insisting that the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk include an Article that directed both parties "to refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public or military institutions of the other party." The Bolsheviks, however, did not plan to take the proscription seriously, for even during the earlier stages in the negotiations, the Soviet delegate, Joffe, turned to the Austrian, Count Czernin, and cheerfully told him: "I hope we may soon be able to start a revolution in your country."

Progressives'—First Vintage

A measure of the Soviet success was the meeting of an All-Russian Congress of International Prisoners of War on April 17, 1918, attended by four hundred delegates, who issued a manifesto appealing to all pris-



national Guard, a heterogeneous collection of prisoners of war recruited to Communism. After several years in the Red Army, he returned, like thousands of others, to become a Communist agitator in his own country. Another "pioneer" was the late Ernst Reuter, a German P.W. who soon became disenchanted with Communism and turned into one of its bitterest enemies.

The Russians persistently violated the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by indoctrinating and enrolling German P.W.s into the Red Army. To comply with the letter of the treaty in the face of numerous German protests, those affected were hastily granted Soviet citizenship. Accordingly, Trotsky directed his army "to accept into the ranks of the Red Army only those volunteers from among foreigners who have accepted Russian citizenship." Soon after the treaty was signed, the Kaiser's ambassador arrived in Moscow to be greeted at a May Day parade by a detachment of German ex-prisoners of war shouting exhortations against the Kaiser. Winston Churchill testifies: "The German prisoners liberated from Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk returned home infected by the Lenin virus. In large numbers they refused again to go to the Front."

With the collapse of the Central



oners of war to join the Red Army or return home and become "pioneers of the international socialist revolution of proletarians." Among the recruits was a young Croat from the Austrian Army, Josip Broz, later known as Marshal Tito, who voluntarily joined the Red Inter-

Powers and Allied intervention in Russia, Allied troops were exposed to Communist infection. Some American prisoners captured at Archangel turned up at an international meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on December 19, 1918.

Among the Frenchmen who chose Communism at the end of the First World War were André Marty and Charles Tillon, who led the famous Black Sea mutiny in the French fleet at Odessa in 1919. These two were destined to become the stormy petrels of the French Communist Party until their expulsion in 1952.

A Two-Way Street

During the Second World War it was Nazi Germany, not the Soviet Union, that most successfully utilized the strategy of "war by treason."

More than two million Soviet soldiers surrendered after minimum resistance; hundreds of thousands of Red Army troops, cutting across the entire ethnic spectrum of the Soviet Union, were organized into special Wehrmacht units, the most famous being Lieutenant General Vlasov's "Russian Army of Liberation."

The German experience demonstrated that this new concept of warfare was by no means the exclusive domain of Communism. This the Soviets are not likely to forget, although the Allies, when they

forcibly repatriated Soviet deserters to Russia after the last war, came very close to sanctioning the Soviet monopoly of "war by treason."

In the Korean War the force of



events compelled the U.N. command to break that monopoly.

II. At Panmunjom

"IN WAR," Lenin taught his followers, "you must never tie your hands with considerations of formality." Judging from events in Korea, he might also have stated conversely that the enemy should be ensnared in a web of legal technicalities. At Panmunjom, the Communist negotiators skillfully kept the United Nations representatives floundering for twelve months over the prisoner-of-war issue.

Both sides in Korea had agreed voluntarily to abide by the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention, although neither side had formally ratified it. Article 118 of the Convention emphatically and unambiguously states: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities," while Article 7 expressly forbids a prisoner to renounce his rights under the Convention.

The Communists, in accordance with Lenin's dictum, had conven-

iently rid themselves of all legal encumbrances by either impressing into the North Korean Army or "releasing at the front" nearly fifty thousand South Korean prisoners of war. When called upon to explain this flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention, General Nam Il retorted that this act was "just and right," whereas the U.N. refusal to repatriate by force some fifty thousand Chinese and North Korean prisoners was a patent violation of international law. Both sides were flouting the Geneva Convention, but the Communists confronted the U.N. Command with a *fait accompli* while insisting that the U.N. conform to the letter of that document. The Soviet principle apparently holds that bourgeois states should stick to the international law they have invented while the Communist nations need conform to it only when it is to their advantage.

At Panmunjom the U.N. negotiators foolishly permitted the Communists to choose the Geneva Convention as the field of legal battle. Since this document overwhelmingly supported the Communist position on repatriation, the U.N. attempt to interpret it as allowing "voluntary repatriation" was not only tactically inept but also betrayed an abysmal ignorance of international law and the rules of successful diplomacy.

Actually, stripped of all technical superficialities, the real issue was whether the strategy of mass treason could be successfully employed against Communism as a major weapon in the international power struggle. The Communists never lost sight of this fact and never stopped struggling for their monopoly.

Overwhelmed by Success

Even after the U.N. negotiators became aware of the real issue, they were still unprepared to accept the idea that the instigation of mass treason in the ranks of the enemy had become one of the weapons in democracy's arsenal. The fact that the political loyalties of over fifty thousand enemy soldiers had been so shattered that they refused to go home and were even demanding that they be permitted to fight against Communism first appalled, then exhilarated, then eventually sobered the United Nations Command. What

had been considered merely a tactical psychological-warfare "trick"—showering enemy soldiers at the front with propaganda leaflets—had brought embarrassingly important results.

During the General Assembly debates last October, the French delegate said that the experience of past wars had made it "scarcely conceivable that a prisoner should have a valid reason for preferring exile to repatriation." In fact, the categorical provisions of the Geneva Convention on compulsory and immediate repatriation of war prisoners had been largely dictated by the fear that in future wars Communist countries might detain prisoners indefinitely, just as the Soviet Union had held many German and Japanese troops captured during the Second World War.

AT PANMUNJOM the U.N. Command was stuck: Those little leaflets had made it morally responsi-



ble for undermining the loyalty of the Chinese and North Korean prisoners. It just could not force the repatriation of more than fifty thousand human beings who had abjured their loyalty with full knowledge of



the penalties for heresy and apostasy in a Communist society.

IN ITS desperate search for valid arguments, the U.N. Command finally had recourse to the Communist record on repatriation. At one debate on the issue, the U.N. delegation pointed out that some of the very first treaties signed between the Soviet Republic and other powers had provided for the repatriation of prisoners of war on the basis "of the free consent of the prisoners." In many of the more than a dozen such treaties and conventions drawn up in 1920 and 1921, the use of force to implement repatriation was expressly forbidden.

Moreover, during the Second World War the Red Army had invited German troops retreating in Romania to desert with a promise to permit them to travel to any country of their choice at the end of the war. When Major General William K. Harrison confronted General Nam Il with this information, the North Korean icily "noted" it but offered no reply. Later, in response to further inquiry, he blurted out that the Soviet offer had been "just and good" because it was made to a fascist army in the throes of defeat.

Thus at long last the U.N. delegates at Panmunjom were forced to abandon the letter of the Geneva Convention and to face the real issue—which was democracy's right to use "war by treason."

III. Mao's Ghost Army

The United Nations managed to escape being trapped within its own web of legality, but it failed singularly to cripple the Communist posi-

tion by launching an assault of its own.

Perhaps the most vulnerable spot in the Communist legal armor, and one that could have been used to excellent bargaining advantage, was the obscure juridical status of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and, more pertinently, that of the Chinese prisoners of war.

The legal status of the Chinese People's Volunteers constituted a unique situation in the modern international law of war. Although it was a military organization legally associated neither with any state, recognized or unrecognized, nor with an insurrectionary movement seeking



legal political power, it managed to gain, by default, *de facto* status as a subject of international law when it was accorded belligerent status by the U.N. Command.


This converted the Chinese Peo-

ple's Volunteers into a legal entity in itself, because legally neither the Peking government nor the North Korean People's Republic was responsible for this military force. It possessed its own supreme command, separate and distinct from that of the North Korean Army, and was not legally under the command of the duly constituted armed forces of the Chinese People's Republic. At Panmunjom the Chinese delegation was directly responsible to the commander in chief of the Chinese People's Volunteers, General Peng Teh-huai, who signed the Armistice Agreement as a co-equal with Supreme Commander Marshal Kim Il Sung of North Korea and General Mark Clark of the United Nations.

The fiction of the autonomous Volunteers had been contrived in order to relieve the Peking régime of any obligations that might be incurred as a result of its intervention. Although this ruse did not prevent a reluctant General Assembly from tardily branding Red China an aggressor, it did generate enough confusion to paralyze effective sanctions against the Red Chinese régime. While Peking chose to speak with an authoritative voice as a *de facto* belligerent in the Korean War, its pretense of legal neutrality gave its territory immunity from attack.

WHY DID the U.N. acquiesce in this fiction? There seem to have





been three principal reasons. First was the morbid fear on the part of the United States that if it recognized the "Volunteers" as Red China's army, it might be driven to recognize Red China at the end of the fighting. Second, acquiescence in this fiction represented the U.N.'s *quid pro quo* for the tacit acceptance by the Communist side of Japan's formal neutrality and immunity from attack. Third was the fear that if China were officially considered a participant in the Korean conflict, this would provide Mao's government with a pretext for invoking the provisions of the Sino-Soviet military alliance of 1950.

Whatever validity these three factors might have had, they should not have tied the hands of the U.N. representatives during the truce negotiations, and above all, after the truce was signed.

Whose Deserters?

Diplomats and international lawyers, searching for a rule that might apply to the Chinese "Volunteers," could look in vain at the Geneva Convention. Article 5 of the Convention provides that "Should any doubt arise as to whether persons having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories [of prisoners] enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention

until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." Hence, the Geneva Convention placed the U.N. under no legal obligation to repatriate the Chinese prisoners until their position was clarified.

THE TERM "Volunteers," furthermore, reduced the entire question of repatriation to irrelevancy. By the very nature of their organization, the "Volunteers" had no legal fatherland to which they could be returned. Since neither North Korea nor China exercised *de jure* control over the "Volunteers," neither country could legally insist upon their repatriation. For if the Chinese were fighting in Korea voluntarily, there existed no conceivable legal obstacle to prevent them from passing voluntarily to the other side. They could not be accounted deserters in the legal sense, since they would not be deserting from the armed forces of a state but from a vague aggregation of fighting men.

These arguments assumed a new significance when, after the truce, Peking announced that U.N. airmen were being forcibly detained in China because they had been forced down on the territory of a neutral country and hence were ineligible for repatriation. Their release, it was proclaimed cryptically, would be subject to diplomatic negotiations. If China is neutral and not obligated

to return members of the United Nations forces who are forced into its territory, by what stretch of the imagination can it demand the repatriation, forcible or otherwise, of Chinese found in South Korea?

The very fact that the effrontery of the Peking Government could go so far proves to what an extent the hard-pressed U.N. representatives were out-maneuvered. The game of diplomacy and international law can be very tricky—particularly when it is played not by diplomats or international lawyers but by admirals and generals.

They Have More to Lose

When our moral and legal order is threatened with obliteration, those who would destroy it attempt first to use it as a rope to strangle its defenders. We are, however, not required by our own legal and moral code to allow it to become a suicide pact. The character of the modern struggle with Communism is such that it compels its opponents to adjust to new methods of defense or face total ruin.

The importance of "voluntary repatriation" far transcends the mere fact that the function and character of so-called psychological warfare have been fundamentally altered. It means, first, that "war by treason" is clearly recognized and accepted by all sides as a weapon in armed conflict. At the same time, it means that the West will not stand by helplessly while the loyalty of its citizens is corrupted and subverted, for "voluntary repatriation" confirms what the Nazis discovered—that the subjects of Communism are by no means immune from subversion.

The Communist leaders have been served notice that they incur a considerable risk if they ever send their soldiers beyond the Iron Curtain.



Recession Ahead?

Ask Arthur Burns

M. J. ROSSANT

"**I**F WE HAVE five million unemployed next November, the Communist issue will be a dead duck."

A Republican Congressman, arriving back in Washington after a few months of political fence mending, captured in this one sentence the major worry of the new session of Congress, whose members are preoccupied with the thought that before they are through, each will have to stand up and be counted on measures that deal with recession. Although some of the measures will remind them uncomfortably of the 1930's, all know that bad business is disastrous politics.

Time was when the politicians were not so sure they needed to worry about economics. Last March, Congress refused to provide any money to keep the three-man Council of Economic Advisers in being. Arthur F. Burns, the forty-nine-year-old Columbia economist who was hired to be the chief economic brain trust in a businessmen's Administration, is fortunately a patient man. By summer Congress changed its mind and gave the President funds to reopen the Council and hire two other Economic Advisers, Walter Stewart and Neil Jacoby.

Together with Gabriel S. Hauge, the President's Administrative Assistant for Economic Problems, these men are responsible for telling the President what is likely to happen in American business and what should be done about it.

As the undisputed leader of this group, Arthur Burns is already one of the most powerful men in the

country. He is not impressed with his own skill as an oracle: "The gift of prophecy," he said in the last report he wrote before joining the government last spring, "has never loomed large in the endowment of economists." Yet Burns, along with Hauge, is the only official who has a regular weekly appointment with the President—every Monday morning—when they read current signs and future portents.

That Seven Per Cent

When the new Administration took office, business activity was high and moving higher. True, farm and commodity prices were not caught up in this strong forward push, but the big drop in these sectors had come in 1952. The continued slump in farm income, at a much slower rate, seemed more a cause for political than economic concern as all other business barometers kept rising. During the first six months of 1953, the country as a whole enjoyed a boom.

But business has now slid down from its lofty peaks. Some economists trace the drop to the leveling off of defense spending last spring. It was then that the Federal Reserve's index of industrial production, which is perhaps the key indicator of economic activity, began to drop. Slowly but steadily, industrial production has slowed down, until at the year's end it was about seven per cent below its record high—this in a country that has been used to regarding constant growth in production as normal. This drop has been followed by



a small decline in employment as well as reductions in working hours and a slackening in retail sales.

These drops have caused some hardship, but almost everywhere outside farming areas business is still very good. In fact, there are a number of very important indicators, like personal savings and capital-equipment expenditures, that are not following the general pattern. And there is little doubt that the unseasonable warm spell enjoyed by most of the nation during the last months of 1953 had a lot to do with the decline in sales of soft goods. So even though activity has slackened, most economists—and businessmen—believe that the decline has been nothing more than a "readjustment," as the current cliché has it, to more "normal" levels. They think that readjustments, with ups as well as downs, will continue without incurring any real trouble, thanks to the "automatic stabilizers" that the government has at its command.

Just How Automatic?

By stabilizers they mean ways in which the government automatically puts more money into the hands of all of us, to encourage us to keep on buying goods and thus keep production up. When farmers start getting less than the "support price" for their products, the government gives them extra money to make up the difference. As more people become unemployed, the government pays out unemployment compensation, which substitutes to some extent for the wages they are no longer get-

ting. The whole Social Security System provides a stable flow of income that we didn't have before the 1929 crash.

But there is a growing number of economists who pin little faith on these stabilizers. They see no powerful expansive force that can start the economy moving upward once more. They feel that if we rely just on automatic measures, the "readjustment" can snowball into a "recession." Arthur Burns, who has a formidable reputation for reading business barometers, would concede that the decline so far has been a healthy readjustment. Yet he is saying as clearly as he knows how that the automatic stabilizers may not be effective enough to prevent a much deeper slump.

EVEN before coming to Washington, Burns often said that our economy was prone to wide fluctuations, and disagreed with those who believed that the government now had the tools to keep the economy on a relatively even keel. We know enough, he would say, to avoid a depression like that of the early 1930's, but he would not rule out a slump such as we had in 1937-1938.

These were his views in the past, and they haven't changed much. "I'm not complacent," he told an interviewer recently. "I don't put any stock in the notion that the government's built-in shock absorbers can automatically stabilize the economy. If that were so, I wouldn't be needed."

Burns acknowledges that the level of unemployment compensation, for example, was probably adequate before the Second World War. But the economy is now much bigger, while payments to the jobless are still frozen at low levels. After ten years of inflation and enormous growth in living standards, insurance like this is, he believes, virtually useless against a severe slump.

Though a recession is still only a threat, Burns and his associates have been considering a series of plans to prevent it from becoming a reality. The first step, as he himself has indicated, is the strengthening of the present stabilizers. The Administration would like to see a higher floor in the minimum-wage law—say a dollar an hour instead of seventy-five

cents. Burns points out that this would have a larger effect than it might because it would tend to push up wages all along the line. An effort also will be made to talk Congress into putting that minimum-wage floor under more job categories. In addition, the Economic Advisers favor giving more unemployment compensation to more categories of people. There is a limit to what the Federal government can do along this line without changing the law. As it now stands, payments are left to the discretion of the states, though

was increasing because of higher interest rates) and tight (there was a greater demand than supply). This was no accident of the market place; it was the result of a deliberate attempt, started in 1951, to check the post-Korean inflation. But when it began to bring on deflation, the policy was reversed and new reserves of credit were made available to the whole banking system. During the last half of 1953, interest rates went down and potential borrowers, whether businessmen or individual consumers, had little trouble getting bank loans.

Just how effective this kind of "monetary policy" can be is debatable—and is much debated. Burns admits that it is probably much more significant as a means of checking an inflation than moderating a decline. He is fully behind the new long-range Federal Reserve policy, which is aimed to provide continuing increases in the money supply at a rate parallel to our economic growth. It is based on the notion that we need steady increases to maintain the price level, and has been described as a "comfortable-money" policy, which may see a doubling of the money supply every twenty-five years. In the coming year, at least, there should be no shortage of money for borrowers. The question is whether businessmen and consumers will borrow enough.

the Federal government collects the funds used to administer the state unemployment laws. But even without new action by Congress, the President may call upon the states to raise the level of payments, and offer broader Federal help to make this possible.

Monetary Controls

There are other more indirect measures that Burns thinks should be used—in fact, should be resorted to first. Through the Federal Reserve System, the government can affect the amount of money that each of us has in his bank account, and the amount of credit each of us can get from a bank or a store or an automobile dealer. Burns believes that the present drop has been slowed by the Federal Reserve Board's decision last June to ease the money market.

Money had become both expensive (that is, its cost to borrowers



EASIER FINANCING conditions to spur the building and sale of new homes are now being planned to fit in with the new credit policy. Again, Burns will depend on indirect means. All across the board, down payments will be reduced and the limits on what can be loaned will be raised. Low-income families may be persuaded to buy homes by cutting out down payments altogether and giving them as long as forty years to pay off the sale price. These plans, if they are approved, will probably mean close to a million housing "starts" in 1954, a ten per cent drop from the 1953 level, but that figure would have looked like the millennium to the most enthusiastic New Deal housing experts of the 1930's. In addition, there will be liberalized loans for repairs and refurbishment of old houses. Burns himself is known to be in favor of also keeping

alive what is left of the subsidized low-rent housing program.

The Federal Reserve's policy goes hand in hand with the Treasury's budget policy, and here too Burns has a say. He thinks that the White House decision to allow the excess-profits tax to expire and to reduce income taxes in 1954 was taken for economic as well as political reasons. These tax reductions may help to offset the decline in government spending that will start taking effect when the new fiscal year begins in July, 1954. There are rumors that Burns is considering a plan that would cut existing excise taxes while adding some others to make up the lost revenue. In addition, there are plans afoot to help business by giving more favorable depreciation allowances for plant and equipment.

Burns emphasizes that with income taxes accounting for over seventy per cent of Federal revenues, any decline in business activity will be immediately felt by the Treasury in lower receipts. This "automatic" deficit is itself a stabilizer of sorts, for when the government spends at a faster rate than it collects, it puts money into our pockets, encourages us to buy more goods, and thus brakes the decline in production. But the impact is negative, and Burns doesn't think it's enough. This is why he is studying the effect of a *deliberately* induced deficit which can be produced either by further tax cuts or by more government spending, or a combination of both.

A Bank of Public Works

If the situation demands it, then, Burns does not hesitate to advise the use of a direct public-works program that would require additional Federal spending on a big scale. Public works are notoriously slow as a contra-cyclical device. Projects sponsored by the New Deal were not fully effective until 1936, or well after the depression had touched bottom. In the event that public works will be needed once more, Burns will be ready to move at once. A public-works program aimed at improving military installations, highways, and hospitals is already prepared and will be sent to Congress for funds whenever the President, on Burns's advice, decides it

is needed. If the economy should really nose-dive, there are plans for spending \$15 to \$20 billion on public works—a scale of spending beyond the dreams of the freest-spending New Dealers.

Burns does not propose using all



these plans at once. Timing, according to him, is an important part of any anti-recession policy. He thinks that government actions "that are well suited to one decline of aggregate output may be poorly suited to another, even if its magnitude and momentum are no different."

But even his most modest devices cannot be used unless Congress makes sweeping changes in present laws. Burns knows this; he has stated that the Executive Branch, no matter how prompt its action, cannot do enough alone. So the big barrier to effective action may be Congress. Of course, with its eyes on the November election, it will look with favor on any measures that will reduce taxes. But there's no certainty that the present line-up will back the other moves—the direct new measures and strengthening of the old—that Burns deems necessary to counteract any further declines.

Scholar and Skeptic

As the Administration's leading economic thinker, Burns will have to explain and justify his program to an unruly Congress. This will be an entirely new experience for him. But then, so was his venture into policymaking.

Although nominally a Democrat (who liked Ike in 1952), Burns was never among the swarm of professors, social workers, businessmen, lawyers, and journalists who served the New Deal. A soft-spoken scholar who would rather spend his time thinking than doing, he has made a specialty of studying the business

cycle during his years as a professor of economics at Columbia University and as director of research for the National Bureau of Economic Research, a private nonprofit organization devoted to business economic problems. Though Burns has never been in business, he probably knows as much about business conditions as anyone in the country.

IT WAS this knowledge that earned the call to Washington. (While General Eisenhower was Columbia's president, Burns recalls they met only once—at a faculty reception.) He is not primarily a theorist, although he has made some trenchant criticisms of Keynesian doctrine. Rather, he has shone as an analyst, stressing the importance of compiling facts and figures about the workings of our economy, and amassing a great deal of information about the effects of various devices to moderate the ups and downs of business. Some economists, well acquainted with him at Columbia and the National Bureau, doubted his ability to get along with the hard headed businessmen in the Administration. But many of these new colleagues are also old associates from the National Bureau, now holding down important jobs in Washington, including the Treasury's Marion B. Folsom and Dan Throop Smith, the Federal Reserve's Ralph Young and Winfield Rieffer, Commerce's Walter Williams, and the Budget Bureau's Don Belcher.

But even though he is not exactly an outsider, Burns as a thinker is a somewhat anomalous figure in this businessmen's Administration. In many ways he is the personification of the brain trust, yet he does not pretend to omniscience. He has few illusions, and these few do not include the idea that government action can solve all problems. But he has a strong streak of philosophical optimism along with his basic attitude of skepticism. These traits are responsible for his frank admission that he does not know all the answers and also for his faith that, given enough facts and thought, some answers can be found.

Burns's most impressive quality, according to Washington colleagues, is his firmness. He is unimpressed by either political oratory or reputa-

tion, and in his quiet but unrelenting manner insists on sticking to the facts. Moreover, he is unafraid of responsibility. Burns received a free hand in choosing Stewart and Jacoby as his fellow members of CEA, and though they share his tasks he has become the Council's sole spokesman in order to prevent the conflict among members that often caused trouble in the past. His firm, inquiring approach has made a good impression on members of the Eisenhower Cabinet, while his penchant for staying in the background has enhanced his prestige with everyone but the press.

But it is Congress that will have to be won over, and Burns may succeed, if only because Republican politicians are becoming aware that economic decline means political decline.

Fear As a Weapon

Burns knows he will have to count on this mounting fear to get his program through. In preparing his

plans, he has followed the principles laid down in the Employment Act of 1946, which called for the establishment of the CEA in order to help the Executive formulate programs designed to maintain prosperity and at the same time strengthen free enterprise.

Burns puts as much emphasis on the latter objective as the former, a point of view, he feels, that has not always prevailed in the past. But he also is under no illusions. He concedes that there are many Administration supporters, in and out of Congress, who will consider that he is proposing New Deal policies. A higher minimum wage, a "shelf" of public works, easier credit for low-cost housing—these are measures, Burns confesses, that will be disliked by many Congressmen and businessmen. Yet if the present Administration is to avoid—in Adlai Stevenson's words—the onus of depression by association, then such measures must be used.

One reason for Burns's confidence

is his feeling that the President shares the view that his job is not to please the G.O.P. but to protect the welfare of the nation. That does not mean he will woo Democratic support; indeed, he has been extremely careful to keep out of partisan politics altogether. But Burns is convinced that even the present "readjustment" will become much more serious unless Congress acts, and he will not hold back plans for fear that they will be dissipated in political controversy.

ULTIMATELY, Burns would like to see an economic general staff within the government, regardless of the party in power. Its function would be to study economic conditions and formulate plans to cope with any eventuality. Meanwhile, the CEA and its anti-recession plans will have to do. Whether they will do enough depends on whether a divided Congress sets election-year politics aside long enough to listen to what Arthur Burns has to say.

Turkey: The Revolution That Knew When to Stop

BOGDAN RADITSA

IT WAS SOMETHING of a relief to arrive in Turkey after the long trip eastward across Europe. I always find the politics of France and Italy and Greece fascinating, but I also find them exhausting, and Turkey was the only country I visited that didn't seem to be full of angry people shouting at one another. Turkey was also the only country I visited where I did not see the words AMERICANS GO HOME spelled out prominently on walls and sidewalks.

The Turks were not just being polite. The fact is that anti-Americanism is simply not as fashionable in Turkey as it is elsewhere these days. In Turkey I found the intellectual elite no less than the general citizenry well pleased with the prog-

ress their country has made with American help since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. As they see it, American aid has not only defended them against their traditional enemy, Russia, but has also brought nearer to completion a national revolution whose scope can only be compared with that of Russia. The Turks, for special reasons of their own, see no paradox here.

THE FIRST TIME I visited Turkey was in 1930, when the industrialization of a backward agrarian economy and the secularization of an authoritarian Moslem society were still regarded with skepticism and even hostility. The only thing that

seemed to hearten the Turks very much in 1930, as I recollect, was the signing of a treaty of friendship with Greece.

Hostility between Turks and Greeks, one of the oldest on record, had been used by the British to provide a bloody epilogue to the First World War. The Turks were on the losing side in 1918, and for the British that was pretext enough for encouraging the Greeks to invade Asia Minor at Smyrna and push on into Anatolia while the British did their part by holding Constantinople. It didn't work. The Turks beat the invaders and drove Greek colonies more than two thousand years old back into Europe.

At that point a lot of Turks began



breathing fire and wanted to keep right on going across the Aegean, reconquer the Balkans, and bring the Ottoman Empire back to life. But the commander who had led the victorious Turkish forces said "No." He had other ideas for Turkey, and in 1923, when the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed, the tall, handsome soldier became its first President. He was Mustafa Kemal, later to be known by the honorary title Atatürk, or Father of the Turks.

No Veils, No Fezzes

Kemal announced that Turkey was to become "republican, nationalist, populist, state socialist, secular, and revolutionary." And he set about the job of making it so. The outward and visible signs of the old Moslem authority were to be done away with by force if necessary. The veil and the fez were outlawed. At first this meant that women never went out at all and that men defiantly exchanged their Borsalinos for fezzes whenever they thought they wouldn't be caught. (Italian hatters got rich in those days outfitting the entire male population of Turkey.) Kemal himself set an awesome example in matters of dress and personal grooming. Like Peter the Great, he insisted that his subordinates buy their

clothes and even have their hair cut according to the western style. In the middle of the day, Turkish officials paraded at state functions in white tie and tails, followed by unveiled ladies in long dresses who could scarcely have been more embarrassed if they had been stark naked.

Kemal's revolution went forward on many fronts. The sultanate and caliphate were abolished. To help the literacy program, the Arabic alphabet was replaced by the simpler Latin alphabet. The western calendar was adopted. Civil laws based on the Swiss code were substituted for the holy laws of the Koran. And public education on Swiss and American patterns was established. The example of the Soviet Union was constantly in Kemal's mind during those early years, not because of any special Marxist predilection on his part but simply because the Russians, like the Turks, seemed intent on catching up with the Reformation, the Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution in one giant step. In those days the Soviet Union was too busy at home to cause much trouble abroad, and Kemal, anxious to profit by the example of collective industrialization,

re-established diplomatic relations. He introduced a Five-Year Plan of his own and took over all private property in the name of the state.

ON THE TRIP from Istanbul to Ankara I looked out the window of the fast diesel train (bought with Marshall Plan money in Germany) and saw the results of Kemal's revolution before my eyes. The last time I had made the trip, in 1930, there had been nothing to see but flat, dusty steppes stretching off monotonously to the horizon. Today Anatolia is green. From my window I was able to count three makes of American tractors and combines—John Deere, International Harvester, and McCormick. The tractors have transformed the desert.

The train was crowded. I struck up a conversation with the attractive young woman who was sitting next to me. She was dressed in a neat cotton business suit and she told me that she was going to the capital to look for a job. When I said that I had come from the United States, she pointed out the window. "Marshall Yardimi," she said, and she smiled. Her fiancé had recently returned to his job in Ankara from a trip to Ohio, where he had studied engineering. In a boasting tone, she told me that he would now give the knowledge he had received in Ohio to the rest of his countrymen. Just before we pulled into Ankara, she took a lipstick and a compact out of her handbag and made sure that her face was as she wanted it to be.

Ankara itself was an even more dramatic demonstration of the changes that had taken place in Turkey in the interval between my two visits. In 1930 government officials and foreign diplomats were still grumbling about Kemal's decision to make Ankara the capital. Obliged to exchange their beautiful villas on the Bosphorus for dingy rooms in Ankara's only halfway decent hotel, they considered the new capital a frontier town.

But today Ankara is a modern metropolis of more than three hundred thousand inhabitants. Concrete government buildings and apartment houses line Atatürk Boulevard, the broad thoroughfare that runs from one end of the city to the other. The dusty plateau is now ver-



dant with deeply shaded lawns and lake-studded parks. New highways built with American aid connect the capital with villages that used to be isolated from the rest of the world. And down the new highways from the old villages, in busses, jeeps, and American cars, the Turks are coming in ever-increasing numbers. They come to see the sights, to visit their National Assembly, and in the late afternoon to take their ease in coffee shops and restaurants, waiting for the papers from Istanbul and discussing the future of their country with an enthusiasm that I had seen in only a few Turks during my 1930 visit. Everywhere you go, statues of the arch-enthusiast look down on the city with satisfaction.

Applying the Brakes

To my mind, the most amazing accomplishment of Kemal Atatürk's revolutionary movement was its ability to pause at the very height of its power, hold an election, and then gracefully turn over the power of government to an Opposition party. Collectivist revolutions don't often permit themselves to be turned back by anything so innocuous as a few hundred thousand votes. But in May, 1950, eighty-eight per cent of the Turkish electorate went to the polls and turned out the Republican People's Party, which had been in power for nearly three decades. The new Democratic Party, whose platform called for an infusion of capitalism into the Turkish economy, won 408 seats in the National Assembly; the Republican People's Party came in a poor second with only 69 seats; 9 seats went to independents

and one seat to the reactionary Millyet, or Nation Party. Ismet İnönü, the man who took over the Presidency when Kemal died in 1938, forthwith arranged for the orderly transfer of government to the leaders of the Democratic Party—Celâl Bayar as President and Adnan Menderes as Prime Minister. State socialism has given way to free enterprise, and the Turks have shown that their democracy is mature enough to make such a change without bloodshed.

It was to a large extent the character of the man Kemal Atatürk that enabled Turkey to travel such a great distance in such a short time without skidding off the road on either the Left or the Right, into either Communism or fascism. His interest in the Soviet program was always pragmatic, never doctrinaire. He never lost a healthy skepticism toward his dangerous neighbor to the north. As long as both nations were weak and unpopular, struggling desperately to catch up with western Europe and the United States, there was a basis for understanding between them. But as both nations grew stronger and as the old czarist designs against Turkey reappeared, Kemal's followers had no difficulty in deciding to keep their revolution an entirely Turkish affair. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and a sizable flow of private investment from the United States confirmed their decision. Turkey's army is a mainstay of NATO, and progress has been made in the formation of a Balkan alliance with Greece and Yugoslavia. To my mind, Turkey's calm and stability in the

presence of the Soviet threat have been unique.

American people as well as American money have had a great deal to do with Turkey's present ideological climate. Nearly everyone told me that American military and diplomatic staffs have behaved themselves extremely well in Turkey during the past six or seven years. From what I hear, a great deal of credit for this should go to the recent American Ambassadors. Their policy has been one of limited intervention, and they have known not only when to interfere but—more important—when not to interfere. Another explanation for the good relations between Turks and Americans lies in the fact that they are very much alike in directness and candor. "The Turks want to learn all they can," an American businessman told me, "and they know we can teach them. So we get along fine."

HOW COULD our revolution have gone Communist?" a graying government official asked me, with a smile that only showed how serious he was. "We had no capitalists to execute and no industrial proletariat to arouse." He meant that before Kemal Atatürk nationalized everything, business was always conducted in Turkey by those whom the Turks call Levantines—people such as Greeks or Jews who lived among the Turks and handled their financial transactions for them. For a good Moslem to be what we now think of as a capitalist was not considered respectable. Free enterprise is as revolutionary as socialism in Turkey.

But the Turks learn fast. The rugged Anatolian peasants who have always been the core of the Turkish racial stock are rapidly turning into a modern middle class of professional people, prosperous farmers, and businessmen. Kemal once said, "The peasant is the master of the country." Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes have not interpreted their election as a mandate to counter-revolution. They have gone right on bringing the peasantry, which represents eighty per cent of the total population, into the political life of the nation. In fact, they have placed even more emphasis on the industrialization of agriculture than their predecessors did.

"Bread for Everybody" has been the slogan of the new Government, and its success may be measured by the fact that Turkey, which used to have to import grain, now exports it.

The transformation of the Turkish economy is far from complete; but already the nation is self-supporting, and before long it will surely enjoy the most advanced and stable economy in either of the two areas it bridges, the Middle East and the Balkans.

The Conservative Revolutionaries

President Bayar is a modest man who once refused to let himself be the subject of a "cover story" on Turkey in an American magazine. His pet project has been the Industrial Development Bank, which was chartered as soon as the new Government took office. Assisted by the government-owned Turkish Central Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, this privately owned and managed bank makes loans to enterprises that are also privately owned and offers managerial and technical assistance to its clients.

Prime Minister Menderes, a bald and stocky man in his early fifties, has two main objectives: not to let reaction destroy the progress that his country has made in the last thirty years and to encourage initiative and flexibility in the economy. It was also Menderes's idea to send Turkish troops to Korea, not only to show his nation's gratitude for American aid but also, it has been suggested, to show the Russians how Turks can fight. The Turkish contingent of the U.N. force, one of the three largest, accomplished both missions.

An eloquent speaker in the Assembly, Menderes exerts immense personal power over both his party and his Government. Yet he seems genuinely reluctant to accept the popular idea that this is the Menderes Era in Turkey.

While most of Menderes's program involves a continuation or slight modifications of past policies, at least one of his problems has a unique twist. "What we dread most is not Communism itself," I was told again and again, "but the religious and political reaction the Communists are supporting." Old *hodzcas*—Moslem priests—are being actively

supported by Communists in their efforts to restore the old rule. Some of the Kemal memorials that were set up in practically every village square have been pulled down at night, and in Serik the decision of the municipality's officials to remove the statue was prevented from being carried out only by angry demonstrations of the townspeople.

"There are very few Communists here in Turkey," the editor of a pro-Government newspaper told me. "No more than three hundred in all, and we know their names for the most part. Students at Istanbul University, a handful of professors, a few agents in the coal mines of Zonguldak on the Black Sea." Last October, 167 alleged members of the outlawed Communist Party were brought before a military tribunal

reasons, were determined to overthrow the Government.

The Nation Party was also outlawed. Explaining the decision, Menderes declared: "Religious spirit is one thing, but reaction is another. They are using religion to get political power."

Politicians of both the Government and the Opposition, their eyes on the 1954 election, made gestures to attract the voters of the outlawed Nation Party. At first the Republican People's Party went so far as to offer some rather compromising commitments on the ground that the Opposition ought to stick together. But the Turks had seen enough of that sort of thing, and even before the Democrats could make an issue of it, old Ismet Inönü announced his determination not to abandon Ata-



and charged with conspiring to divide the Turks by fomenting religious reaction. During the trial it was brought out that Communists had systematically infiltrated the reactionary Nation Party and used that group of Moslem fanatics to oppose the progressive reforms of the Republic. The Communists have argued that "Communism is twentieth-century Mohammedanism," but the real basis for the strange unity is that both groups, for different

Turk's revolutionary program just to win an election.

It is clear that whether the results of this year's election establish a socialist, a capitalist, or a mixed economy in Turkey, the progress of thirty years will not be endangered. There is enough difference between the two parties to provide a healthy antidote to revolutionary excess, but on all important issues they are united. The Turkish revolution is safe, from its enemies and from itself.

The Lower Depths Of Upper Broadway

ANZIA YEZIERSKA

LIKE a shipwrecked sailor who has found an island in the center of the storm, I have found a room, a roof over my head. It is clean and quiet. It has a door I can shut. I can work again in peace and privacy. After the noise, the crowdedness and debasing filth of the "Residence Hotel" I have recently moved out of, the clean quiet of my new-found room is overwhelming.

ONLY three years ago, when I first went to live in that building, it was a nice place. There was a rug in the lobby, and soft light from lamps fell across comfortable easy chairs. Courteous elevator men in gray uniforms took the residents up to their floors. The room I rented, though shabby and in need of paint, was clean, and I could afford the rent. The view to the Hudson River over the roofs seemed to make the room larger and brighter than it actually was.

On every floor there were four apartments of five or six rooms so arranged that the rooms were rented individually. Each apartment had a community kitchen and refrigerator. A white-tiled bathroom with tub and shower was shared with the other roomers. We did not lock our doors, or count the number of eggs in the box, or mark the level of milk in the bottle left in the refrigerator. There was a feeling of comradeship and mutual trust. The landlady was like one of us, struggling to make ends meet.

For more than two years I was very much at home. Then one day, when I was passing through the lobby, I noticed a new man in the office. At his desk were two others, smooth-shaven, full-faced men with thick necks and sharp, shrewd eyes.

These were the new landlords. How different they were from the harassed, anxiety-ridden landlady we roomers had been used to and somewhat sorry for! Their newly tailored suits hugged their fat paunches. They all smiled the same cold smile.

The first sign of their new régime was a bright blue canvas awning outside the entrance, with bold white letters: RESIDENCE HOTEL.

We were curious to know what



improvements and innovations would accompany the new sign. We dreamed of clean windows, newly painted rooms, new mattresses on our beds. Soon we stopped dreaming. One morning, one elevator was shut down. Somebody rolled up the beautiful rug in the lobby and took it away. The easy chairs and the lamps also vanished. Dingy electric fixtures were screwed into the ceiling, casting a pale, harsh light on the worn tile floor and on the one stone bench against the wall. The lobby looked

naked. The only relics left of the past were the stained-glass windows and the imposing glass doorway.

In the following days, families of young Puerto Ricans began to appear. A Juilliard music student who had occupied a room down the hall on my floor moved out. The next morning, an entire Puerto Rican family—wife, husband, and four children—were eating breakfast in the kitchen. We tried to talk, but I didn't understand their Spanish and they didn't get my English. We wound up waving our arms at one another in sign language. All of them lived in the single room the student had vacated.

The maid who used to clean our rooms once a week stopped coming. For a while we waited, puzzled. Then we realized that the maid would not come again and that we would have to do our own cleaning.

Another roomer moved out and another Puerto Rican family of five moved into the single room. In many apartments throughout the house, as old roomers moved away, Puerto Rican families crowded in.

"How did you hear of this place?" I asked an English-speaking Puerto Rican, wondering where all these people came from. He showed me a daily ad in a Spanish-language newspaper, inviting its readers to come and enjoy the comforts of America in a "Residence Hotel."

THERE WERE now twelve people using one bathroom, twelve people to keep their food in one refrigerator and cook their meals on one stove. I bought a small electric plate, cooked in my room, and gave up using the refrigerator.

By being very careful in my spending for food, I had hoped to save

enough money to have my room painted for Christmas. But now, in addition to the electric stove, I had to buy cleaning equipment.

A retired social worker from upstairs, crowded out of her kitchen as I was, often came to have breakfast with me on a Sunday morning.

"Isn't it against the law to crowd so many people into one room?" I asked.

"According to law, children aren't people," she said. "Nothing going on here is as heart-rending as what is happening to the children cooped up in those rooms. They're not allowed to play in front of the house for fear passersby will suspect the overcrowding. No wonder this place is a madhouse Sundays and evenings when the office is closed. It's the only time the poor kids can escape, and so they run up and down the stairs and shriek like wild animals."

ALL AROUND US radios blared, the noise coming at us through every wall. From the kitchen at the end of the hall we could hear angry voices outshouting one another in Spanish and English.

"Caramba! Who rob me my baby's milk?"

"You dirty half-breed! I want you to know you're talking to a lady!"

"I work! I decent!" The Spanish rose in a shriek. "You *puta!* You make the money easy. I call police!"

Hurried steps in the hall. Someone knocked, then pushed open my door. It was a redhead who had recently moved in with a fanfare of service from the new landlords.

"Did you hear those Spics? Damn them!" Her voice cracked with rage. "They oughtn't to let in that scum with decent people. I won't stand it. Either they move or I will."

Her bright alcoholic eyes were as heavily made up as her full rouged lips. She wore a tight-fitting pink-satin kimono and red mules with little pompons of ostrich feathers.

"Ladies! Come—do me the favor!" She literally dragged us into her room. The windows were closed, shades down, the place reeking with cigarette smoke and alcohol fumes. On the bureau, amid beer and whisky bottles, was a miniature bride and bridegroom enclosed in glass, and a picture of a G.I. in uniform.

"I want you to know I'm married."



She pointed at her marriage certificate displayed on the wall in a gilt frame. Her hand caressed the photograph of the G.I. "That's my husband! He's in the Army. He's risking his life for such trash. Isn't it awful what our country is coming to? Those half-breeds call themselves Americans. My people were here hundreds of years. And she threatens me with the police!"

By the time we got back to my room the fight had begun again. Shouts in Spanish grew louder, clamoring, "*Policia! Policia!*" A baby began to scream, setting off a whole chorus of crying children.

Over the radio in the next room an announcer's voice came on, deep, powerful, and calm:

"This is New York, city of opportunity, where over eight million people live in peace and harmony and enjoy the benefits of democracy."

After my neighbor left, I looked out the window over the wide expanse of roofs to the George Washington Bridge against the sky. What a comfort it was to have that sky to look up to. If you are old and alone, and have less and less to live on, that sky banishes fear, shames you out of self-pity. Old people, poor people can't choose where they live.

I GOT TO like the Puerto Ricans. They had come, like other immigrants, hoping to better themselves economically and to give their children the kind of education they did not have on their island. There was something fascinating about their

gaiety. How their eyes sparkled when they dressed in their rainbow colors, like butterflies on the wing! The children were irresistible.

ONE AFTERNOON, I picked up the *New York Times* and read that twenty-five million Americans, one-sixth of the nation, live today in city slums or substandard houses.

The Puerto Ricans are the newest victims of speculators getting rich quick on the housing shortage. Who would believe that fifty years ago this so-called "Residence Hotel" had been one of the finest buildings on upper Broadway, the home of prosperous professional people and successful businessmen?

What was happening to this house was what had already happened to thousands of other houses. Well-to-do families had moved away, banks had taken over the mortgages, rents of the no-longer-fashionable apartments had been greatly reduced, and women had taken over these low-rent apartments and turned them into rooms with kitchen privileges. But even three years ago, we roomers had felt that we had a kind of home. What has happened to us and to the house that had once been home? Who was it who said, "One half the world doesn't know how the other half lives"? All around us were people in comfortable homes, unaware of what was going on in this jungle.

AS I stood in line to pay the rent, I couldn't help overhearing what my friend the social worker



from upstairs was saying: "I know that the law requires landlords to paint every three years. I haven't asked for any repairs in ten years. I do everything I can myself. But the ceiling is coming down. It should be fixed before my sister returns from the hospital."

The landlord tapped his pencil impatiently. "You'll have to pay three dollars a week more for your sister."

"We've been living here, both of us, for the last ten years—"

"Your sister is not registered as a regular tenant—"

"We've always lived together here. I support my sister. I can't pay more—"

"If you can't pay, move—"

"We can't move!" Her voice was shrill and frightened. "We have no money to move—"

"Go on relief. I'm not in business for charity."

WHEN the landlords weren't collecting rent, they played poker in the office. Their game was often interrupted by importunate roomers clamoring for repairs.

The refrigerator got out of order, and my Puerto Rican neighbors asked me to go to the office and ask to have it fixed.

I said my piece. The landlord rose from the table with a frown.

"The refrigerator is out of order again," I repeated.

He pointed to the clock. "It's near closing time. Come tomorrow—"

"The children's milk will be spoiled by tomorrow," I protested.

He sat down and picked up his cards. "Raise you five," he said, shoving the chips forward.

I walked away. It was not the first time that the children's milk had soured.

WITH hordes of people coming and going, in and out, day and night, and no supervision, anything can happen. And in this "Residence Hotel," as the filthy congestion thickened, more and more hard, sinister faces began to appear, and worse and worse things did happen.

A woman stepped into the kitchen to cook oatmeal. When she returned to her room, her purse and watch were gone. A clerk came home from work and found his door pried open. His clothes, his radio, and his typewriter had been stolen. Thefts became as frequent as the ups and downs of the alcoholics, ending in brawls. There were not enough police to answer the calls for help, as overcrowding brought reckless violence. The halls, littered with rubbish, reeked with the smells of bathrooms and kitchens. The one elevator still in service groaned up and down, packed as the subway during rush hours. In this elevator, a sign was posted: VISITORS NOT ALLOWED AFTER 11 P.M. BY ORDER OF THE OFFICE. Since the office closed at six, this virtuous sign evoked cynical smiles.

AND now the payoff: the fifteen per cent rent increase enacted by the Republican legislature in Albany and swiftly signed by Governor Dewey. The announcement of the increase was followed by newspaper stories of reduced rents because of deterioration and overcrowding in some of the slum houses of Harlem. Those stories were illustrated with photographs of the State Housing Commissioner surrounded by smiling children from the houses where the rents had been cut. These stories and photos gave me the courage to apply to the local housing agency for a reduction in rent. I was fortunate to find a clerk of more than average

intelligence. She looked up the status of the apartment house and told me that there were so many complaints against it that the rating was being studied.

"You must pay the fifteen per cent increase," she said, handing me a duplicate questionnaire to be filled out. "But if investigations prove that services have deteriorated, your money will be refunded."

Weeks of waiting turned into months. In the meantime, I had to eat less to pay the increased rent. I telephoned the housing agency. I went there again and again to get some action on my application. But now I was met by less friendly clerks with the same mechanical answer: "We have thousands of cases like yours. Wait till we get to yours."

At last, after more months of waiting, I received an official postal card, stating that my case had been given a number. I would have to wait until the number was reached.

After more waiting, I again went to the housing authority. Again I explained the growing filth and crowding for which I was paying increased rent. This time action was taken. One morning the landlord stormed into my room.

"I hear you don't like it here," he said. He glared at me. "You had better move."

"But I can't move until I find a place."

"I'll get you out."

AT THE END of the week I received a notice of a three-dollar-a-week rent increase.

Again I went to the housing agency. This time I saw the clerk



who had interviewed me the day I had applied for a rent reduction. When I showed her the new notice from the landlord, she turned me over to her superior. After hearing me out, he phoned the research clerk to look up the status of our building. After another hour of waiting, the man turned to me. "I'm sorry. I have bad news for you. The house is now decontrolled."

"What do you mean, *decontrolled*?"

"It is now listed as a hotel and is out of our jurisdiction—"

"Aren't there laws to protect us? How can a house that has become a slum be *decontrolled*? Can the label 'hotel' be used to violate all the human decencies?"

"I advise you to move. The house is *decontrolled*. The landlord can raise your rent again—"

"Is your housing agency protecting people, or shielding lawbreakers? You advise me to move. You know very well every time they force one of us to move out they can double and triple the rent by crowding in another Puerto Rican family into that overcrowded house."

"Are you questioning the laws of the country?" he asked.

I walked away.

SOMETIMES it takes the crisis of utter despair to create a turn for the better. Sometimes it takes the drive of necessity to rouse us from our despair. Only a block away I found a home—a small cheap room with a view of the sky. Cleanliness, privacy, and a view of the sky are luxuries enough to make me humbly happy.

But the cries of the children in that house from which I have escaped still haunt my dreams at night.



VIEWS & REVIEWS

British TV: How

Decorous Can Ads Get?

BLAKE EHRLICH


FOR THE PAST eight months, leonine British calm has been laid aside and the unicorn within the British public has been unleashed against the threat of commercial television's invasion of the adless airwaves of Great Britain. Up until now, radio and television broadcasting in Britain has been carried on exclusively by the Parliament-chartered British Broadcasting Corporation, which derives its \$46-million-a-year income from license fees of one pound (\$2.80) a year for radios and two pounds a year for TV sets. Advertising has been forbidden. Until now telecasting has been done for love; now, if the Government has its way, it will be done for money. Millions of Englishmen, including an impressive section of the Tory Party, have been outraged at the idea of British frequencies losing their amateur standing.

The Houses of Parliament have echoed with unusually unrestrained speeches. During 1953 the *Times* carried more letters on the subject of commercial television than on the Coronation, Everest, the Korean truce, or the Mau Mau. The core of the opposition to advertising on British TV has been the belief that television is no mere extension of radio and movies, but an utterly pervasive and apparently irresistible force in the life of the community. The Archbishop of York has announced that he considers television at least as powerful in our lives as the atom bomb — adding that he would not hand the bomb over to commercial sponsors. Among Labour

Party members, of course, there is absolute agreement that all means of communication should belong to the state.

Opening Gun

Back in May, 1952, the Tory Government announced that "in the expanding field of television some element of competition" with the BBC might be introduced. There the matter simmered for several months, with advertising agencies inconspicuously gathering their market research and plotting future package shows. In



February, 1953, the Government announced in the House of Commons that "an element of competition by television based on advertising revenue shall be permitted." Further muffled activity prevailed until June, time for the Coronation and for Parliamentary considerations of Government TV plans. The BBC's triumphant Coronation coverage was,



significantly for the battle to come, marred only by American commercial rebroadcasts, which drew protests from British newspapers and from M.P.s on both sides of the House. The cry was that Britain's most sacred ceremony had been desecrated by crass Yankee sponsors seeking to profit from the crowning of a British monarch. Despite reports of British diplomatic agents in America that U.S. television had done no such thing, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting, found himself defending in Parliament one J. Fred Muggs, a U.S. chimpanzee TV star, and exonerating him from complicity in the "debasement" of Coronation telecasts. It has been "strongly suggested" (the British rarely "allege" or "charge" in such matters) that the uproar was fomented by the BBC to demonstrate its purity and excellence as compared to the low scruples and bad taste of commercial telecasters.

Almost simultaneously with *l'affaire Muggs*, a letter appeared in the *Times*. Now a letter to the *Times*, like a bullet at Sarajevo, can have major consequences. The letter was signed by Lady Violet Bonham Carter, a leader of the Liberal Party;

Lord Brand, Lord Halifax, and Lord Waverley, Conservatives; and Tom O'Brien, Labour M.P. and member of the mighty Trade Union Council. These worthies expressed faith in the BBC as "the finest broadcasting system in the world," and expressed hope "that the Government will yield no further to the intense pressure to which they have been subjected by a comparatively small number of interested parties . . ."

THIS WAS followed by another letter to the *Times* declaring that the acceptance of commercial television "would be to throw away an instrument with very great possibilities for good." The signers were the Vice-Chancellors of Cambridge, Oxford, Belfast, London, Glasgow, and nine other universities.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, and the Bishop of Manchester denounced commercial TV to their dioceses. The British Council of Churches came out against it. The *Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Sunday Observer*, and scores of other publications zeroed in their heaviest editorial artillery.

A *Guardian* editorial began: "The Prime Minister's worst lapse since

he took office was to surrender to the minority in his party who want to have commercial television. He defied some of his most respected . . . elder statesmen and a very strong volume of opinion in his party . . ." The *Guardian* finished by recommending to its readers a pamphlet called "Dear Viewer," by Labour M.P. Christopher Mayhew. The pamphlet revealed, among other things, that of the few "militants" who had shoved the commercial TV idea through the Cabinet, one was an official of an American-owned advertising agency and another was on the board of a giant firm of TV equipment manufacturers.

Editorially the *Times* was the most impassioned of all. It had a crusher for those Britons who thought they could have both the high standards of a public-service organization and the pleasures of profit taking: "For a time this might be true," said the *Times*. "During some hours, no doubt, the citizens of Troy believed they had preserved their inviolability and gained a horse."

Insisting that television and radio are too important to "be given as hostages to fortune," the *Times* went on: "Television is likely to be one of the most powerful social influences of the next fifty years. It should be as unthinkable to hand it over to sponsoring as it would to give advertisers a decisive say in school curricula . . . Television will affect the morals, the values, and the outlook of many of the children of today and tomorrow as much as will their formal education. And after being subjected to these two forces simultaneously for some ten years, for the rest of their lives they will have television alone. . . . Things could fall short of the worst that has happened there [the United States] and still be deplorable."

Dames and Daggers

The horrors of sponsored TV in the United States were the clinching argument in Round One. Brandishing copies of the fruitless protests made by U.S. educators, clergymen, psychiatrists, and parents' groups, the anti-sponsor people showed that kiddies' programs across the Atlantic were models of bestiality. They revealed that the perfect formula for a program designed to sell a product

was "variety plus sex plus crime." By quoting New York advertising executives, they demonstrated that the ideal program is not the best program, but rather the one that the largest number of family members will watch without being actively offended. "To get a maximum TV audience," the British were told, "a program must appeal to everyone at once, even if it means appealing keenly to no one. The program must appeal to no particular age, no particular taste and no particular intellectual level. It must play down to the lowest common factor in us all, treating us as units in a mass, without personality, without individuality."

Reports from correspondents with more exposure to and more sympathy for American institutions and attitudes had little effect. Kenneth Harris of the *Observer* wrote: "In spite of several attempts, nobody has been able to establish that looking at these [horror] programs had done American children any harm . . . TV causes damage to physical well-being and mental alertness when carried to excess. So, of course, do Latin and Algebra."

It would not do. The British wanted their youngsters and themselves protected from daily diets of dames and daggers, cosh and cutie, foisted off as entertainment but really designed to stun them into buying something they didn't want. ("Advertising by trick. This is the fundamental lie at the heart of commercial television.")

To save themselves, proponents of commercial television made a grisly admission: Commercial TV as practiced in America was indeed horrible, and the American public, with rare exceptions, had been reduced to a market rather than an audience. The commercial TV backers pledged that no such thing would ever happen in Britain; there would be governmental safeguards against it, and besides, British advertisers were too decent and British viewers possessed of too much "innate good taste." Assurances were given to both Houses that the British scheme would "bear no resemblance to the American system."

On June 9, the day scheduled for the TV debate, the Government first announced that not only would the

BBC be kept intact, but had been given permission to go ahead with its plans for extending TV coverage to ninety-five per cent of the nation (eighty-five per cent is now covered by programs averaging five hours a day). Finally, the Government postponed the entire TV debate, promising that in the autumn it would issue a White Paper outlining its plans. "There is . . . real danger," said a Conservative spokesman, "that public opinion is being formed [on the subject] without any balanced or detailed knowledge . . ."

IN THE COMMONS lobby that afternoon, one Government supporter remarked, "We have been beaten by the priests, prigs, and prudes." His fellow advertising enthusiasts thereupon went out to round up their own set of fanatics. Thus there emerged the Popular Television Association to do battle with the anti-commercial National Television Council. Each of these is headed by a Conservative Peer, and the list of vice-presidents of each includes one prominent cricketer, one editor of a weekly paper, one titled literary man, one scientist, one radio-TV figure, a sprinkling of M.P.s from all parties, some educators, some churchmen, and a clutch of noblemen. During the summer and early fall, the coming glories of free enterprise, as outlined by the Government, were amplified thoroughly by the Popular Television Association, the Incorporated Society of British

Advertisers, the Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in Advertising, and the Society for Individual Freedom. Unfazed by such an array of adversaries, the National Television Council kept its mimeographs hot, with the active support of most of the "intellectual" press and the various organs of organized labor and the Labour Party.

Freedom of Expression and Free Enterprise vs. Monopoly; Realist vs. Prude, Prig et al.; BBC Uplift vs. Lowbrowness; The Virtue of Being British vs. The Temptations of Filthy Lucre—these were the main points over which partisans slugged it out in the pubs. Through the smoke of this small civil war, visible on the battlements was the hissable figure of Dirty Desmond, the American showboat villain and slick, cynical seducer; from the gallery came cries of "Don't trust him an inch!" and "Look behind you, Nell!" After poll and survey results were published, the early argument that advertisers and the public wanted commercial TV was dropped; the public didn't want it, and on the advertising side the clamor came from agencies, not manufacturers. It was a splendid fight, and most instructive to the foreigner who had seldom seen the British punch below the belt used so effectively to uphold the lofty British ideal.

The Queen Speaks

In November the Queen ended her Speech from the Throne before the





House of Lords in the following words:

"My Ministers will lay before you their proposals . . . for television development.

"My Ministers will give further consideration to the question of reform of the House of Lords."

Two weeks later the Government issued its White Paper on television, and probably wished immediately that it had clipped the Lords first and brought up TV second. Led by Lord Halifax, Churchill's great friend and one of the most respected men in the Commonwealth, the anti-commercial wing of the Tory Party, together with its Church of England, Labour, and Liberal allies, presented before the House of Lords a motion recognizing the desirability of an alternative television program but disapproving the Government's views on the subject.

The thing the White Paper had said most emphatically was that advertisers wouldn't be able to buy blank time on stations and fill it with their own material, as they do in the former colonies of the New World. There would be, the Government said, a public corporation like the BBC which would own and operate the stations, selling time to private "program companies" which in turn would sell advertising to fill

in the empty spaces between programs. Commercials would be separate and distinct from the program matter, and the public corporation would have the right to pass in advance on all scripts, regulate advertising copy, and ban "specified classes of matter" from the air.

The debate on the Halifax motion was one of the most passionate in the history of the House of Lords. Forty lords spoke on November 25 and 26, while peers squeezed for places in the ordinarily sparsely populated chamber. On the shallow steps of the Throne perched eminent commoners of both parties. The Government applied a two-line whip, which is a semi-official order to get out and vote the party line. Labour and Liberals, since almost all their membership opposed the White Paper, assumed a superior morality in refraining from application of the whip. Taunted for its party politicking, the Government retorted through its floor leader that the anti-commercial pressure group constituted a whip in itself.

THROUGHOUT the debate the game of "I did not either!" and "You did, too, so there!" went on, the insults and name calling carefully embossed in lofty House of Lords prose. Little new was added to the argu-

ments of the previous six months.

Several Government speakers pursued the "prude and prig" line:

"They [the opponents] are very high-minded, very sincere—but so were Cromwell and his Puritans."

"I respect . . . the sincerity of those who fear that there will be degradation of the public mind by the influence of so-called commercial television. Will you not respect equally those who, from the bottom of their hearts, believe that in your fear and mistrust you do a grave injustice to our fellows?"

"[This is] yet another aspect of the eternal question: how are you to reconcile liberty with authority, order with freedom?"

"Are your Lordships justified in this Year of Grace in saying . . . to the producer that he cannot be trusted to produce a program that will not debase his fellow citizens . . . to the public that they cannot be trusted to make a choice for what they would choose would inevitably be bad?"

"Must we assume that the best appeal to the British is salaciousness, horror and indecency."

"Are we all so very low-minded? . . . Are we seriously going to say from now onwards that our entertainment has to be limited to what is approved by elderly and superior persons?"

"Above all let us remember . . . the difference between the mentality of British advertisers and the mentality of American advertisers, and the difference between British and American taste. . . . I believe that this is an imponderable which may well be the most important difference of all."

IN OPPOSITION, Lord Hailsham (who, as Mr. Quintin Hogg before he inherited his title, was one of the bright and big-future young Tories in Commons) remarked that it was a "queer example of classical finance" for a Conservative Government to pay \$1,400,000 of public money to set up a broadcasting system that would enable advertisers to make a profit. The basic theme of the opposition was that "money talks," and would in the end be the sole criterion of what went over the commercial airwaves, no matter how corporations were set up. Proposals for establish-

ing competing networks within the BBC and for limiting the amount of advertising revenue so that stations would be sure of independence from advertisers were thrown into the hopper. Only one speaker attacked the BBC, all the others from both sides bowing low in its praise.

The main opposition argument was summed up in a cartoon gag line reprinted from the *New Yorker*, which was widely circulated during the debate:

"If you didn't enjoy our show, folks—if the talent seemed mediocre and the script a little weak—please remember that the savings represented in our low TV budget are passed directly on to you in the form of lower prices."

At the end of all the noble emotion and forensics, Lord Salisbury, Conservative Leader of the Lords, finished his speech by saying: "We have never spoiled for a fight on this question. We have always said that, within the particular basic principles of our scheme, we were ready to consider any suggestions that might be made," and by conceding that some opposing speeches had "contained the germs of ideas . . . certainly worthy of further study."

Lord Hailsham then told Lord Salisbury: "Well, go into your Lobby with your Party majority and with a Party majority in this House you will win . . ." He was perfectly right. The Government carried the day 157 to 87. It was a good warm-up for the next to last round in the House of Commons on December 15 and 16. The result of two days of debate there was that a Labourite amendment declaring sponsored television to be "contrary to the public interest" was defeated, 302 votes to 280.

There will be further concessions to the "Babel of mutually destructive criticism," as Lord Salisbury called the anti-commercial all-party group, but there will be, eventually, "some element of competition." At all events, commercial broadcasts could not physically begin until 1955 at the earliest, when a breathless Britain, huddled beneath its outstretched aerials, will learn that *Guinness Is Good For It*. If Britons don't like what appears on the commercialized channels, they can always switch to the BBC. They'll still be paying for it.

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
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THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Volume VI: TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY, by Winston S. Churchill. Houghton Mifflin Company. \$6.

"SOMBRE INDEED would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian Soviet Union." So said Winston Churchill in his report to the Commons on the Crimea (Yalta) Conference of 1945. Even as he was speaking, the Grand Alliance which had fought and won the war was breaking into pieces, triumph turning into tragedy. This is the theme of the sixth and final volume of Churchill's magisterial history of the Second World War—that the war was won and civilization saved by the effective co-operation of the Allies; that the peace was lost and the world plunged into tragedy by the rupture of the alliance. It is, in short, a study of statesmanship in the grand manner, of the statesmanship that operates not only on a national stage but on the world stage.

The grand theme, the study of the alliance, is in fact divided here into two parts which appear to be separate and distinct but which are as connected and as interdependent as organs of the body: the wartime alliance and the postwar divisions. The wartime alliance brought serious problems and sharp differences of opinion, and to these Churchill devotes more than passing attention. Yet these belong now to the past; they will be quarreled over by historians, but cannot be changed. The postwar divisions and hostilities still fill our skies and threaten us continually with the deluge, and what Churchill has to say of the causes, the course, and the consequences of those divisions has a strident relevance.

First, then, to the lessons of the

war, and let us remember that it is only because we were victorious that we can draw these lessons. The first, the obvious, the positive fact—and the one we are curiously inclined to overlook—is that the Grand Alliance actually worked. Even the Russian end of it worked, though not always well. But the alliance of the English-speaking peoples, and with them the forces of resistance and freedom

was nothing in it if they were made common to everybody. A man might propose marriage to a young lady, but it was not much use if he were told that she would always be a sister to him." This was the man, remember, who at the darkest hour of French history proposed joint citizenship to the French.

ONE THING that Churchill insists on here, as in the earlier volumes, is that this was, and was to be, a partnership of equals. It is an elementary fact which Roosevelt and Truman never forgot, but which many of us now appear to forget or to ignore. Churchill reminds us that Britain furnished a major part of the sea power in the Atlantic, accounted for the major toll of submarines, contributed half the total air force in the European theater, furnished the larger part of the armies that fought in Italy, and suffered heavier casualties at home and on the fields of battle than did the United States. And he allows us to read between the lines his conviction that Britain contributed its share, or more, of scientific genius, of inventive talent, of political understanding, of the grasp of world affairs and of world strategy so essential to victory. He cannot say this outright (though in the end he comes close to it) because so much of it was his own contribution.

Differences over Strategy

At times the Prime Minister—remember that he had had forty years' experience in war, fighting it, writing about it, directing it—did not have his way on matters of grand strategy. He reveals how frustrating the experience was, and how unfortunate. The differences of opinion



everywhere on the Continent, was more intimate than anything of the kind in the whole of history. Others have forgotten this; Churchill does not forget it, and in the midst of war and of controversy he can speak of Britain and America as "the truest friends and comrades that ever fought side by side as allies." He was eager that this friendship continue, that it develop into something more intimate than friendship. When he proposed to President Truman the merging of all naval and military facilities of Great Britain and the United States, he added that "There

between Churchill and the Americans took the form of differences over military strategy, but actually they involved much more. This was the crux of the matter: Where the Americans—for on this point Roosevelt and General Eisenhower and the Chiefs of Staff seemed in agreement—thought in terms of winning the war in Europe and then turning on Japan, Churchill preferred to look ahead, beyond war and victory, to the peacetime settlements and their consequences. Two major controversies and one minor one run through the pages of this volume and merit attention here.

THIS FIRST had to do with the wisdom of Operation ANVIL, the attack on southern France. Originally it had been planned to coincide with the invasion of Normandy, and with this timing seemed to make sense. But did it make sense two months later? Churchill said "No." It would do no good; it would contribute nothing to victory in the north; it would merely drain away men, guns, and shipping that were badly needed elsewhere. Far better, he argued, to build up Field Marshal Alexander's army in Italy, lunge through the German lines, cross the Po, swing around the Adriatic, seize the Istrian Peninsula, strike northward through Austria, and capture Vienna in the heart of Europe. Such a campaign offered dazzling prospects: It would end the war in Italy and place the western Allies at a vantage point in the later division of Europe between East and West.

The Americans, less enthusiastic or less imaginative—or perhaps less interested in distant political objectives—insisted on holding to the original plan. Alexander's army was reduced and ANVIL was struck. Who was right? Churchill still insists that he was right and that subsequent events prove it. Operation ANVIL, he writes, "involved the complete ruin of all our great affairs in the Mediterranean. . . . A very little more, half of what had been taken from us, and we could have broken into the valley of the Po, with all the gleaming possibilities and prizes which lay open towards Vienna."

Three observations are relevant here. First, necessary or superfluous, ANVIL was a smashing success; within

a month the invaders had seized the great Mediterranean ports of Toulon and Marseilles, captured over a hundred thousand prisoners, inspired resistance forces throughout France to rise, freed a large part of France from German rule and for Allied supply, and raced northward to the Belfort Gap and a junction with Eisenhower's victorious armies. Second, though Churchill now presumes that we would have been victorious in Italy and Austria, there is no assurance that that victory could have been won as planned. German resistance was tough, and between Istria and Vienna lay some of the

most forbidding country in central Europe. Third, it is suggestive that nowhere does Churchill raise the larger question of the grand strategy of the Italian campaign after the capture of Rome. It is possible to argue that what was really called for was not a massive offensive through Italy and Austria, but rather a stalemate north of Rome and concentration of all forces in France.

THE SECOND military controversy—that to which Chester Wilmot devoted a substantial part of his *Struggle for Europe*—gets curiously little attention here. This is the con-

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troversy over the grand strategy of the advance into Germany. Montgomery, supported we must believe by Churchill, favored one big drive along the coast, freeing the great ports, mopping up the V-2 launching sites, cutting off Denmark, and striking swiftly at Berlin. Eisenhower, with the ardent support of Bradley and Patton, preferred to attack all along the line from the coast to Mannheim and cut Germany into ribbons. It was Eisenhower's plan that was adopted, and it worked. Whether the other would have worked better will forever remain a matter for speculation.

This controversy over the advance into Germany was closely related to the last great controversy over military-political strategy: the advance into eastern Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Churchill, ever bold and aggressive, wanted the Allied troops to push on as fast and as far as possible, seize strategic advance posts deep in the heart of Europe, and then present the Russians with a military *fait accompli*. He does not note the contradiction between this proposal and the argument for the single drive along the north coast. Actually something of what Churchill hoped came to pass; Eisenhower's armies did advance more rapidly than the Russians, did penetrate into eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia.

What to do? Hold what had been taken, or withdraw to agreed-

It is too late now to reconsider ANVIL, too late to strike for Vienna, too late to advance east of the Elbe or plant western battle flags in Prague or Brno. But perhaps it is not too late to learn from these chapters of history.

People and Bandits

But the other issues that now engage Sir Winston's attention belong to a different category: they involve ques-

hold that battered country against the Communists. Confronted with open war on the established régime, Churchill decided to hurry British forces to Athens, and at a critical moment—on Christmas Day, 1944—he himself flew out there and took charge. "The vast majority of the American press," he tells us—and you can see that it rankles—"violently condemned our action, which they declared falsified the cause for which they had gone to war." Three years later it was Truman who was "intervening" in Greece, and the "liberal" press of Britain and the Continent that was flaming with criticism of American "imperialism."

It was in his accounting of the Greek crisis to the House that Churchill made a memorable statement on democracy: "Democracy is no harlot to be picked up in the street by a man with a tommy gun. I trust the people, the mass of the people, in almost any country, but I like to make sure that it is the people and not a gang of bandits who think that by violence they can overturn constituted authority."

'It Is Easy . . . to Condemn'

More interesting, and more significant, is the record of Yalta as set forth in these stirring but always judicious pages. Yalta has already slipped its historical moorings and entered the mists and fogs of myth. Somehow it got involved in the caprices of American domestic politics and fell victim to those caprices. Somehow the complex negotiations became a "sellout," a "betrayal," a "catastrophe" that "lost the peace" after the men of arms had won the war. It is Yalta our isolationist politicians have in mind when they whoop it up for the Bricker amendment; it is Yalta our witch hunters have in mind when they argue that the State Department is an annex of the Kremlin. And even otherwise prudent critics, such as Chester Wilmot, have given support to the charge of defeat, though not of betrayal, at Yalta.

WHAT DOES Churchill have to say about all this? Does he give support to the American extremists? Does he give aid and comfort even to the Wilmot interpretation? Quite the contrary.



tions that are still, in a sense, open for debate, policies that are still subject to modification or to enlargement. They have to do, that is, with the postwar world: the break-up of the Grand Alliance, the attempt to establish spheres of influence in the Balkan and Mediterranean areas, the high hopes of Yalta and the frustration of those hopes, the catastrophe of Poland, the weakening of the West, the massive advance of Communism in Europe and in Asia, the



on lines? Eisenhower decided to withdraw, and President Truman backed him up. "This" says Churchill, "struck a knell in my breast."

In one sense it can be said that all these controversies belong to history rather than to the realm of politics.

revival of the West, and the creation of a new Grand Alliance.

It is with understandable gratification that Churchill records the Moscow agreement whereby Britain was conceded a decisive influence in Greece and the fateful decision to

The first thing that emerges from his careful recital of the Yalta Conference is that on all major issues Churchill and Roosevelt saw eye to eye. If Roosevelt was weak and gullible in allowing Russia three votes in the U.N. Assembly, so was Churchill, who says that he thought it only fair that Russia should have this in



the light of the British Commonwealth votes. If Roosevelt compromised his soul in the arrangements for Poland, so did Churchill, for Churchill insisted from the beginning that Britain had a greater interest in a free Poland than did America. He approved the Curzon Line—with minor modifications—as the eastern boundary. He fought for a "representative" government, and concluded that "The Polish communiqué laid down in general terms a policy which *if carried out with loyalty and good faith* might indeed have served its purpose pending the general Peace Treaty" (italics mine). And he says at the end, "It is difficult to see what more we could have done" for Poland.

If Roosevelt betrayed China at Yalta, he did so with the concurrence of Churchill, who had early said that he would "welcome the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific" and that he was in favor of "Russia's losses in the Russo-Japanese War being made good." If Roosevelt's faith in "Uncle Joe" was a sign of weakness or vanity or senility (you can take your choice), what shall we say of Churchill, who proposed this toast to "Uncle Joe" (as he referred to him constantly): "The fire of war has burnt up the misunderstandings

of the past. We feel we have a friend whom we can trust . . ." And in his report to the Commons, he said that he was sure that the Soviet leaders now proposed to live in friendship with the West, and that "I also feel that their word is their bond."

THREE WAS no betrayal at Yalta, no deception, no failure of understanding or of nerve. "All now depended on the spirit in which . . . [the agreements] were carried out," writes Churchill, and it was because the agreements were ignored and flouted by Russia from the beginning that Yalta turned into a tragedy. Nor does Churchill leave this thesis to implication. In stern words he rebukes those who would now make political capital out of the failure of Yalta to ensure One World, or who would use it to divide the divided world still further:

"It is easy, after the Germans are beaten, to condemn those who did their best to hearten the Russian military effort and to keep in harmonious contact with our great Ally, who had suffered so frightfully. What would have happened if we had quarrelled with Russia while the Germans still had three or four hundred divisions on the fighting front? Our hopeful assumptions were soon to be falsified. Still, they were the only ones possible at the time."

No, it was neither over Yalta nor the western policy toward Poland that Churchill differed with the American policy. It was rather over postwar policies, and particularly over the issue of holding occupied territory and maintaining a strong establishment in the heart of Europe. The decisions made on these matters he calls "a fateful milestone for mankind."

When Wolves Are About . . .

With the end of the war in Europe, Churchill, ever bold and imaginative, wished to hold whatever the Allied armies had taken, and to match Russian strength with strength. The decision here depended on Washington, for Eisenhower was Supreme Commander, and the Americans had contributed a large majority of the fighting men and machines. For reasons not yet fully disclosed, Washington—was it Truman or the Chiefs of Staff?—decided to withdraw to the

agreed-on zones and then to redeploy men and machines to the Pacific theater.

Churchill is not disposed to blame Truman for what he holds was a fatefully misguided decision, but rather that "deadly hiatus which existed between the fading of President Roosevelt's strength and the growth of President Truman's grip of the vast world problem." He is more critical of the Presidential advisers, whoever they were, for "In Washington especially longer and wider views should have prevailed . . . when wolves are about the shepherd must guard his flock, even if he does not himself care for mutton."

Truman's Role

Sir Winston is most cutting in his criticism of those isolationist pressures which operated even then to hasten American withdrawal from Europe, and which continue to operate now. The argument that America should steer clear of Europe "was now to play almost as deadly a part at a moment when the future hung in the balance [as it had at the beginning of the war]. There was also at this time a desire to finish off Japan by concentrating all available and suitable forces in the Far East. This was supported by the powerful school which had from the beginning set the Far East before Europe."

It was these same isolationists, these Asia Firsters, these champions



of a break with Britain over the China blockade, who were largely responsible for the pressure on Truman to bring "the boys" home, or

to ship them to the Pacific; now they have the effrontery to blame Truman for not resisting them more successfully.

While fateful decisions were being made in Potsdam and in Washington, there came news of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There has been a good deal of speculation about the question of ultimate responsibility in this matter, and about the degree to which the ultimate consequences of this ultimate weapon were appreciated. Sir Winston's narrative illuminates these questions. Not for a moment did any of those at Potsdam question the wisdom and the rightness of using the bomb. "To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance." On this there was "unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise."

AFTER POTSDAM, Churchill returned to England to learn of his defeat at the hands of the British people, and to turn the Government over to Clement Attlee. He was not happy to lay down the reins of power. "All the pressure of great events, on and against which I had mentally so long maintained my 'flying speed,' would cease and I should fall. The power to shape the future would be denied me. The knowledge and experience I had gathered, the authority and goodwill I had gained in so many countries, would vanish."

It Was No Accident

This brings to a close, then, the most remarkable historical narrative of our time, the most remarkable, probably, in the whole range of literature—history in the grand manner written by the man who made it. Nor are these six stout volumes an isolated performance. After the First World War, too, Churchill gave an accounting, and *The World Crisis* is as fine as anything written about that great conflict.

The connection between Churchill

the leading actor in the great drama of history and Churchill the historian is not accidental, nor is the relation of this historical-mindedness in the great leader of the western coalition to the triumph of that coalition without significance.

For Churchill's profound knowledge of history and awareness of his obligations to history has had consequence of incalculable importance. First it has given to him a perspective that no other contemporary statesman has commanded, an ability to draw upon the lessons of the immediate past which he knew from study. It has enabled him to understand the great currents that control and advance the destinies of man, and to swim with them. Second, this

sense of history has developed in him a responsibility for the future and an awareness of the future, a habit of thinking not in terms of today or tomorrow but of the distant future, not in terms of the immediate victory so easily won but in terms of long-range consequences. He does not ask himself, as do so many of our sunshine patriots, "How can I win a quick and cheap triumph?" but rather "What will be the ultimate verdict of history?"

This pervasive awareness of moral responsibility to the future lifts Sir Winston's narrative far above ordinary histories and memoirs, and permits it to reflect those qualities of magnanimity and nobility that distinguish and grace his character.

The Testament Of Frank Lloyd Wright

WILLIAM KNAPP

THE FUTURE OF ARCHITECTURE, by Frank Lloyd Wright. Horizon Press. \$7.50.


WHETHER or not architecture has a future, it doesn't have much of a past by Frank Lloyd Wright's standards. Just about the last people who did anything worthwhile in this line before Wright were the ancient Persians. The Greeks insisted on building stone replicas of wooden temples, thus becoming the first victims of what Wright calls "grandomania" and serving the main course in the architectural meal that has been giving us social and aesthetic indigestion ever since.

The Romans compounded the Greeks' felony by taking Greek columns (which taper because they were originally copies of tree trunks) and surmounting them with the domes that the sensible people of the Middle East had invented as grain-storage bins. Wright is forced to concede a certain architectural facility to the builders of the Gothic cathedrals, but can never forgive them for what they have done to our contemporary institutions of learning and worship. The Renaissance was the most unspeakable epoch of all, during which

Michelangelo "hurled the Pantheon on top of the Parthenon. The Pope named it St. Peter's and the world called it a day, celebrating the great act ever since in the sincerest form of human flattery . . . imitation."

Blood and Masonry

Wright's pronouncements, verbal and visual, are unfailingly dramatic, and have a way of being dramatized



1905: Larkin Office Building

ly confirmed. Just as this book, containing Wright's praise of the old Persian builders, appeared, so, from beneath the plains of Iran, did the wonders of Persepolis, capital of Darius and Xerxes, newly dusted off by archaeologists. Shortly before Wright joined battle against the wedding-cake absurdities of the "classic" cornice, the blood of forty workmen was mixed with crumpled masonry as the top-heavy fakery of a new wing of the Wisconsin State Capitol collapsed during construction because someone had hung on too much icing.

In 1923, two years after Wright had finished floating the improbable structure of the Imperial Hotel on the mud that underlies Tokyo, to the sneers of resident Westerners and the polite incredulity of Japanese friends, he received word that the city had been wiped out by earthquake and fire. All communications were cut off. At two o'clock one morning an eager Hearst reporter called to inform Wright that the Imperial had been "completely destroyed." Wright remained imperturbable (or Wright): "If you print [that] . . . you will have to retract." The Hearst paper, faithful to its tradition, ignorant of Wright's, printed it. Wright waited for the cablegram he knew he was going to get: HOTEL STANDS UNDAMAGED AS MONUMENT TO YOUR GENIUS HUNDREDS OF HOMELESS PROVIDED BY PERFECTLY MAINTAINED SERVICE.

Lonesome Warrior

Prophets are impossible people, not only because they keep insisting that the impossible must come to pass but because they sometimes bring it to pass. This book, as its title implies, is a collection of what Wright considers his most important prophecies over the years between 1930 and 1953. His fulfilled prophecies, like the victories of any garrulous old campaigner, become a bit tiresome on repetition, despite a style whose erudition, wit, poetry, and occasional bombast remind us that his father was a minister and his ancestry Welsh.

Nor does Wright add to the luster of these triumphs by insisting that no one else (with the exception of his preceptor, Louis Sullivan) was present on St. Crispin's Day—or that,



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
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1900: Boathouse, Madison, Wisconsin

if he did have cohorts in his battles, they were fighting the right fight for the wrong reasons. The successes of "clean" design, of monolithic concrete construction, of bold cantilevering, radiant heating, and the rest have also, of course, been dimmed in succeeding years by the horde of carpetbaggers, camp followers, and artistic black-marketeers who have rushed in, as always, to exploit the ground won.

But Wright's creations and his influence are secure, probably even to that day when future archaeologists start dusting off our Persepolises, asking themselves (Wright suggests) if "we were a jackdaw-people given over to the vice of devices—looking to devices for salvation—and discov-

ering this very salvation to be only another and final device?"

Here is the heart of Wright's larger struggle and seemingly most hopeless prophecy: Are the "devices" to serve us or are we to serve them? Each announcement of a "new triumph of American atomic know-how" gives a more doleful answer. Wright was pessimistic long before the atom, when he said of the machine: "American society has the essential tool of its own age by the blade, as lacerated hands everywhere testify!" The economic basis of Greek architecture was the slave; the economic basis of ours is our infinitely more clever slave, the machine. Our failure to explore its fullest capacities, says Wright, keeps us in aesthetic and social bondage. Wright is prepared to do battle with both the social and artistic consequences of the misused machine. Artistically, he wants us neither "to be damned by senseless sentimentality or . . . sterilized by a factory aesthetic." Under the heading of sterilization he placed the "cardboard-box" modernism of European architects in the 1920's. Today he is watching this pass, as he watched, and helped, McKinley Megalomaniac, Pseudo-Tudor, and Spanish Praline pass. It is to be hoped that he will live long enough to see Railroad-Car Ranch-Type, bastard offspring of his own early Prairie style houses, go the same way.

Polyglot Encampment?

But the "modern" city has not passed, and Wright considers it the greatest malignancy induced by the machine. Although he credits Sullivan with the invention of the skyscraper as we now know it, he has almost ever since been deplored the congestion, traffic jams, ulcers, and hypertension its proliferation has caused. In 1930 he asked an audience at Princeton if the city dweller, "the pickle in this brine," was "to be further reconciled

or harder pushed to keep on insanely crowding himself into vertical grooves in order that he may be stalled in horizontal ones?" The real-estate men are still giving us their answer to that one. In 1939 Wright conveyed to Londoners his notion that "concentration of population is murder—whether in peace time or war." The Luftwaffe gave an answer to that one. For thirty years Wright has been saying that because of the automobile our offices, dwellings, shops, and factories must push out with and beyond the ribbons of our highways. Sluggishly the department-store owners (metropolitan sales dropping), the manufacturers (tight labor market), the apartment dwellers (lung cancer up) are getting the idea. Getting it badly, of course, in the "polyglot encampment" of the "suburban house-parade."

THE HYDROGEN bomb may give the definitive answer to all this, and again Wright will have the tiresome experience of seeing himself proved right. ". . . early in life I had to chose between honest arrogance and hypocritical humility," he says. "I chose honest arrogance, and have seen no occasion to change . . ."

We are richer for the choice, and may some day even be wiser for it. But Wright is eighty-four, and the "honest radicalism" he has always peddled is probably passé, if for no other reason than that we are all too preoccupied with our own survival in the mechanistic pit-and-pendulum we have been building ourselves into despite Wright's warnings. But Wright will have the last word—let it be graven on whatever cantilevered steel-and-glass sarcophagus he designs for himself: "You may find comfort in the reflection that truth and liberty have this invincible excellence, that all man does for them or does against them eventually serves them equally well."

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